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ABSTRACT
During the last century, Korea and the United States have
maintained a cordial and friendly relationship. Normally,
Korea is considered to be a pro-American country in
international society and that has been true.
However in recent years, it has not always been the case
considering the recent phenomena happening in Korean society.
How can it happen that Korea cannot be pro-American given that
Korea normally had been dependent on the United States ?
In this paper, the reality of the Korean's perception of
America is analyzed by focusing on the historical facts that
have affected Koreans' perceptions throughout their
relationships between the United States and Korea. Also, the
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the signing of the Treaty and Commerce in 1882, Korea
and the U.S. entered into a new relationship after two bloody
events marked the beginning of American-Korean relations over
a century ago.
After establishing a relationship, the U.S. has been an
outstanding partner to Korea in international society and
Korea has been oriented to pro-American country. Often the
relationship between the two country has been called bloody-
strengthened relationship especially since the Korean war and
Vietnam war.
In fact, throughout recent history, U.S. has performed the
role of savior in the Korean war, of protector whenever Korea
is in crisis, of modernization guider to follow. In a sense,
Korea has been to a great deal dependent on the U.S. for the
national security, development, trade, etc. Therefore it was
natural that Korea was oriented to pro-American nation. So
called, honeymoon relationship has been persisted throughout
mutual relationship.
However, in recent years, anti-Americanism is on the rise
in South Korea even though the number is minor. Why anti-
Americanism is rising in South Korea against their traditional
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friendly relationship ?
Before the 1980s, the South Korean view of America was
filled with illusion, myths, enviousness, thanks, and the
celebration of God, hence the sentiment of anti-Americanism
could not even think about and could not be heard anywhere in
Korean land. The image of the United States as the special
nation began in 1945 when Koreans perceived Americans as
"liberators" who eliminated the hated Japanese imperialist
rule, and when the U.S. shed blood and saved Korea in the
Korean war, and when U.S. supported Korea everytime Korea is
in need. This kind of relationship and pprception made the
Korean people to regard the America as a brother country.
This perception probably originated in the traditional
Asian view of international relationship. The so-called sadae
relationship between Korea and China was governed by an
extrapolation from the Confucian family system in which the
younger served the older brother and the older felt a duty to
protect younger. Because the United States replaced China as
the older brother in the traditional relationship, it was
natural for Koreans to consider it as a special state, and
such a perception has encouraged them to have various
expectations of it. In a sense, some part of current anti-
Americanism results from frustration against their
expectations of it. And then, what is their critical concern?
That is Korea reunification, sound democratization, and
2
national development.
So through this paper, I would like to illuminate the
historical facts that affects Koreans' perception of America
and the causes of recent negative perceptions for the further
mutual understanding.
In Chapter II, and III, I describe the historical
relationship between the Korea and the U.S. that influences
Koreans' perception of America.
In Chapter IV, I describe the Koreans' general sentiment
about America throughout mutual relationship.
In Chapter V, I describe the recent causes of anti-
sentiment that Koreans feeling about America.
In conclusion, understanding a people's perception of a
country is very important in the process of policy decision,
diplomacy, and mutual relationship especially under the
circumstances that people's voice have more power than
before, like recent South Korea.
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II. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP
A. THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP
1. The First Meeting
Due to its strict, self-imposed isolation, Korea had
remained totally unaware of the existence of a new federal
republic on the other side of the Pacific Ocean until the
appearance of American ships in Korean costal waters in the
mid-nineteenth century.
The earliest documented encounter between the two
peoples took place in January 1853, when a strange looking
ship came to Yongdangp's, (Pusan area). According to the
diary, several Korean officials visited the ship with a
Japanese-language interpreter. No communication could be
established, however, because written messages in either
Chinese characters or the Korean alphabet merely elicited
responses from the newcomers in an unintelligent script that
the Koreans perceived as cloudlike picture drawings. The
officials' report contains a detailed description of the ship,
including notes on its size, equipment, living quarters,
provisions, and the physical appearance of its crew as well as
their clothing and footwear, and even the presence of a young
woman and a male child whose hair was as white as sheep's
wool. [Ref. 1: p.24 ]
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The Koreans were very curious about their physical ap-
pearance. Their prominent noses, brown or blue eyes, po-
rcupinelike hair, tattoos on their bodies, and their variously
shaped caps aroused the Korean's curiosity. It was the
presence on board of two Japanese that enabled the Koreans to
learn that the ship was a whaler driven off course by a storm.
The foreigners on board frequently repeated a word that
sounded like "myorigye" to the Koreans; this word must have
been the name "America". Thus the first recorded meeting of
the Korean and American peoples ended in mutual
incomprehension.
The second visit by Americans to Korea occurred on 15
July 1855. Four crewmen of an American whaling ship,
including two brothers, swam ashore and were cared for and
returned home by way of China by the Koreans. It was only when
the Americans and their escort of Korean officers reached
Peking China that the Koreans first learned that the whales
were from the country of the flowery flag (the stars and
strips]. Thus the four whalers became the first Americans
ever to set foot on Korean soil. Again the incident was
handled by Korean officials as a matter of routine
humanitarian assistance to foreign sailors in distress. It is
unlikely that even this visit by the four Americans to Korea
did much to enhance knowledge of the United States among
Koreans.
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The year 1866 marks a milestone of a sort in Korean-
American relations. An American merchant vessel, the General
Sherman, forced its way up to the Taedong River, ignoring
repeated requests that it turn back, and ran a ground when the
rain-swollen river subsided. The ship was burned and all on
board were killed by Korean officials, who were enraged by the
cavalier use of armed force by the ship's crew. Ostensibly it
came to trade, but the Koreans were suspicious that the real
objective of the trip was to rob the ancient tombs of their
Kings.[Ref. 2:p.25)
In January 1867, Captain Shufeldt was sent from the
Asiatic squadron upon the U.S.S. Wachusette to inquire about
General Sherman. He was told that the crew was mistaken for
pirates and were killed. Commander Febiger on the U.S.S.
Shenandoah went to KOREA in May 1867 to make further inquires
but learned nothing more than Shufeldt. That same month, two
ships which had on board a German-American named Ernst
J.Oppert and F.B.Jenkins, a former American interpreter at the
U.S. Consulate in Shanghai China, went to Korea to steal the
bones of an ex-king and hold them for ransom. But they failed.
This incident strengthened Korea's isolation policy, and
further sullied the already grievously tarnished image of all
foreigners, including Americans.
In the summer of 1868, the U.S. Secretary of State
William H.Seward approached the French, who were also having
6
problems in Korea with the persecution of their Catholics, for
a joint punitive mission. The French refused.
In May 1871, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic
Squadron, Admiral John Rogers, sailed to Korea under the
orders of Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to open Korea for
trade and secure a treaty for protection of shipwrecked
sailors. The Rogers expedition of six ships, carrying eighty-
five guns and 1230 men, met fierce Korean resistance on the
island of Kanghwa, near the mouth of Han river. Their only
result was the destruction of five Korean forts and 350 Korean
soldiers killed. [Ref. 3:p.13 3
Thus the Korean perception of the United States,
forming as it did an ill-differentiated part of the overall
image of foreigners as barbarous thieves and robbers, was
extremely negative when the "Little War with the Heathen"
broke out between the United States and Korea in May 1871. No
sooner had the Koreans beheld the "flowery" flag of America
for the first time they were accused of insulting it, a charge
that served only to exacerbate the distrust between the two
countries. [Ref. 4:p.26] In a word, The American
expeditionary force, while accomplishing nothing positive, led
the Korean government to adopt an official anti-Western policy
in 1871.
The United States now became an identifiable target of
extreme hatred and a source of dread to Koreans. Such epithets
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as "pirates, sea-wolf brigands, and bands of dogs and sheep"
were invariably used when referring to Americans. In response
to a royal query, the prime minister described the U.S. as a
very primitive new country that had been created out of a
dozen villages by a person called "Hwa-song-don" [Washington).
One of the most garish manifestations of this nationwide
xenophobia took the form of stone tablets engraved with the
slogan "Occidental barbarians invaded our land. Not to fight
them is to sue for peace. To adhere to peace is to sell out
the country". These tablets were ordered displayed throughout
Korea "as a warning to our descendants for ten thousand years
to come! [Ref. 5 :p.26 ]
A critical factor that shaded the Korean perception of
the United States was the attempt by the Chinese government to
persuade Korea to establish diplomatic and commercial ties
with France and the United States for the purpose of deterring
a warlike Japan. But the greatest impediment to the opening of
Korea to the Western powers lay in the Korean's fear of Roman
Catholicism which forbade ancestor worship and called for the
destruction of ancestral name tablets. These Catholic tenets
were perceived as striking at the very foundation of the
Korean polity, which cherished filial piety and other forms of
kinship affection as the cardinal human virtues.
The forcible opening of Korea by Japan with the
signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on 27 February
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1876, intimidated China. So, for fearing of Japanese
expansionism, China put more pressure on Korea to establish
treaty relations with the United States.
In 1880, Commander Robert W.Shufeldt tried to nego-
tiate a treaty with Korea again, with respect to opening of
Korea for trade and establishment of a legation at Seoul,
Korea. But he was immediately repelled by the Koreans. So he
sought the help of the Japanese, but his request was also
denied because Japan did not want U.S. involvement in Korea
for the purpose of protecting their own interests. Again he
approached the Chinese Viceroy, Li Hung-Chang, who were
willing to provide assistance because he felt that the
involvement of the U.S., in Korea would offset the growing
influence of the Japanese and Russians.
The motives of Li Hung-chang were two-fold. First, he
wanted to enlist American assistance in restraining the
Japanese and Russian influence on the Korean Peninsula.
Second, Li wanted to make clear the control that China had
over the Korean Kingdom already. So, with the mediation of the
Chinese, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce was established and
signed by King Kojong on May 22,1882, with the following
provisions: "Extra-territoriality for the United States'
citizens, the leasing of land for a legation and residence and
a most favored nation clause.' The second clause in Article I
was later to become the subject of considerable discussion
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between Korea and the United States. It stated, "If other
powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government,
the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of
the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing
their friendly feelings. [Ref. 6: p.21]
Tyler Dennet, a leading historian in American-Far
Eastern relations, claims the opening of Korea in 1882 was
"by far the most important action undertaken by the United
States in Asia until the occupation of the Philippines." and
it was " the most notable success of the American navy in the
peaceful field of diplomacy. [Ref. 7:p.19)
On Korea's part, this Treaty was the beginning of the
open duor policy toward the Western World even though KOREA
did not have any alternatives at that time. The second
clause in 1882 Treaty was to be a future bone of contention
between the two States when Japan began to deal unjustly with
Korea within just a few short years.
2. Treaty of Amity and Commerce
Cordial relations between the United States and Korea
were cultivated after the Treaty. The first American Minister
to Korea, General Lucius H. Foote, the Naval Attache, Ensign
George C. Foulk, Dr. Horace N. Allen, a Presbyterian medical
missionary, and others who arrived in Korea shortly after the
signing of the 1882 treaty contributed much to the growth of
friendly attitudes on the part of the Korean government toward
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the United States. (Ref. 8: p. 11 J
So, during this period, the Korean perception of
America was certainly more than a mere matter of personal
interaction. It was an amalgam of interpersonal empathy and
internatir-al power dynamics. Despite the official United
States policy of noninvolvement in Korean affairs, it was
difficult for an American not to take a very sympathetic
personal interest in Korea.
Minister Hugh A. Dinsmore made the following
observation in his dispatch of 25 June 1887: "It is utterly
impossible for a true American to remain with these people and
not become to a degree personally interested in their
troubles and natural desire for home rule. Koreans could not
help but respond to this American sympathy with trust and
appreciation. [Ref. 9: p.32 ]
On September 2, 1883, Koreans first set foot on
American land. In fact it was the first visit by Koreans to
any Western nation. Min Yong-Ik, the Royal envoy, describes
his experience after returning from America: " I was born in
the dark, I went out into the light, and now I have returned
into the dark again, I can not yet see my way clearly but I
hope to soon"." [Ref. 10: p.35 ] Hong Yong-sik, Min's deputy
on his mission to the West, asserted that the most essential
feature to be copied from the American model was the system of
general public education. Yu Kil-Jun, another member of Min's
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entourage, was the first Korean to publish a book on the West,
and his book left a profound imprint on modern Korean history.
As mentioned above, the early American diplomat kept
a good rapport with the Korean court. Dr. Horace Allen served
not only as the charge of diplomatic affairs and Minister
Plenipotentiary but also as the personal physician to the King
and Queen. American missionaries, the first being Horace
G.Underwood and Henry G. Appenzeller, arrived in 1885. They
accomplished their mission very conscientiously. They
constructed and operated schools, churches and hospitals, etc.
Their first task was very appealing to the Korean Government
and People. Together with their own mission, American business
industry prospered rapidly in Korea. Americans constructed the
first railroad, trolley, lighting plant, public water supply,
telephone, and many office buildings. With the prosperity of
American business, the competition between U.S. and Japan was
fierce. At last, U.S. decided to remain neutral and a non-
interventionist party in the affairs of Korea. So, the U.S.
gave the following instructions to Charge diplomatic affairs
Foulk in 1885: [Ref. 11: pp.64-65 ]
Seoul is the center of conflicting and almost hostile
intrigues involving the interests of China, Japan,
Russian, and England... it is clearly in the interests of
the United States to hold aloof from all this and do
nothing nor be drawn into anything which looks like taking
sides with any of the contestants or entering the lists of
intrigue for our own benefit.
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3. Russio - Japanese War
Even after establishing a Treaty between U.S. and
Korea, the American government showed only casual interests in
Korea at best, and neither the U.S. government, nor the
American people knew much, or cared to know about Korea, her
culture, history, and people.
Thus, Korea received little political assistance from
the United States. The U.S. maintained its strict neutrality
in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and in 1899 when the
Korean emperor asked the American minister Allen to solicit
his government's aid to establish Korea's political neutrality
to protect her independence. When the Russio-Japanese War came
in 1904 over Korea, the United States, not only refused to
help Korea, but actually approved the Japanese actions in
Korea.
As early as 1900, President Theodore Roosevelt favored
Japanese control over Korea. He wrote to a German friend of
his, Speck von Sternburg, that he would "like to see Japan
have Korea," because Japan deserved it in order to check
Russia. [Ref. 12: p.14 ]
In February 1904, the Russio - Japanese War broke out,
and when the Japanese carried out their military occupation of
Korea, neither Great Britain, nor the United States lodged any
protest against such a gross violation of international law.
The Japanese, who were the overall victors, asked the
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U.S. to mediate, So a Treaty known as "Treaty of Portsmouth"
was concluded. Under Article I, gave a Russian acknowledgement
that Japan possessed in Korea, paramount political, military
and economic interests, and engaged not to obstruct such
measures as Japan might seem necessary to take. This Treaty
officially announced international sanction of Japan's right
in Korea.
On 29 July 1905, Taft-katsura agreement was signed
between U.S. and Japan. This agreement gave American
recognition of Japan's hegemony over Korea in return for a
promise from Japan not to interfere in the American-held
Philippine Islands. But to the Koreans, this became known as
the first great betrayal because this agreement could be a
seed of misery in Korea history. Because Korea had a bitter
experience under the occupation of Japan for 36 years
and also this was developed as a cause of divided Korea at
least Korean's point of view. Following this understanding,
Japan annexed Korea in 1910 without any formal protest from
the United States. Kyung, cho chung states in his Korea
Tomorrow: [Ref. 13: p.171 ]
... the U.S. raised no objection to Japan's interests
in Korea, in return for Japan's promise to scay out of the
Philippines. All of the Western powers in the Pacific were
hopeful that Japan would provide a permanent block against
Russian expansion toward the Pacific, in addition they
expected Japan to be so occupied with her northward
expansion that a southward advance would be impossible.
As Korea encountered critical problems in the midst of
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the Russio-Japanese War, the United States showed no intention
of becoming Korea guardians based on a Treaty (1882).
Secretary of State John Hay to the Korean envoy in 1905, said
that "Our interests in Korea were rather more commercial than
political" when the Korean envoy sought American aid to
protect Korea's sovereign rights and independence.[Ref.
14:p.15 ] But from the point of U.S., the acceptance of
Japanese hegemony over Korea was part of the price that U.S.
had to pay for Japanese acceptance of the open door-policy,
World peace and U.S. interests in East Asia.
Under the severe oppression of Japan's control,
Korea's Independence movement happened continuously but most
of the activities were carried out without violence. The most
important demonstration, which was put down cruelly by the
Japanese,occurred on 1 March 1919. This date is still observed
as a national holiday in Korea. This Independence movement was
partly motivated by U.S. President Wilson's address to the
Congress on January 9, 1918. To the Korean people, the call
for self-determination and the principle of justice to all
people and nationalists, and their right to live on equal
terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be
strong or weak was the needed encouragement to announce
Independence against the Japanese.
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4. Cairo and Yalta Agreement
Though Korea disappeared from the World atlas, many
Korean patriots strived for the Korean independence, but they
only received expressions of sympathy.
The question concerning the future of Korea was
addressed for the first time by President Roosevelt. He
suggested that "Korea might be placed under an international
trusteeship, with China, the U.S. and one or two other
countries participating! On hearing the news, Syngman Rhee,
Chairman of the Korean commission in the U.S., sent a letter
to President Roosevelt in May 1943. Rhee urged him "to rectify
the wrong and injustice done to the Korean people and their
nation during the last 38 years," blaming the U.S. for
allowing Japan "to occupy Korea in 1905 and annex Korea in
1910, all in violation of the American-Korean treaty of 1882.
(Ref. 15: p.37 ]
On December 1, 1943, Representatives of the U.S.,
Great Britain, and China issued a Joint statement in Cairo
concerning Korea future in Cairo. They declared, " Mindful of
enslavement of the Korean people, the aforementioned Great
powers are determined that Korea shall, in due course, be free
and independent. (Ref. 15: p.10 ] This statement constituted
an epoch- making event marking a dramatic turning point in
U.S.- Korean relations. The U.S. made a formal commitment to
Korea independence before the whole World.
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At Yalta, it was agreed as a modus vivendi, not a
part of the official agreement, that Korea should be placed
under an international trusteeship. This is evident from the
following conversation between Roosevelt and Stalin:
[Ref. 17: p.16 ]
He said he had in mind a trusteeship composed of a
Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative. He said
the only true experience the U.S. had in this matter was
in the Philippines, where it had taken about fifty years
for the people to be prepared for self-government. He held
that in the case of Korea, the period might be from twenty
to thirty years. Marshall Stalin said the shorter the
period the better, and he inquired whether any foreign
troops would be stationed in Korea. The president replied
in the negative, to which Stalin expressed approval. The
president said there was no question in regard to Korea
which was delicate. He personally did not feel it was
necessary to invite the British to participate in the
trusteeship of Korea, but he held that they might resent
this. Marshall Stalin replied that they would most
certainly be offended. In fact, he said, the Prime
Minister might kill us.
The question is why Roosevelt and Stalin did not
conclude a formal agreement on Korea. What is known is the
fact that this was an unusual agreement with no parallel.
In retrospect, had Roosevelt been more keenly aware of the
historical nature of the Korean question, and had he reached
a concrete, formal agreement at Yalta with a view to stifling
Soviet's ambition for Korea, the United States might have
avoided the artificial division of Korea six months later.
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B. AFTER WORLD WAR II
1. Moscow Agreement and Divided Korea
On July 26, 1945, U.S., United Kingdom, and China
reaffirmed their Cairo statement on Korea in the Potsdam
Declaration. On August 8, 1945, upon its entry into the war
against Japan, the Soviet Union declared its participation to
the Potsdam declaration. The Russian ambition for a division
of Korea has a deep historical background. In 1903, the
Russian Minister, Rosen, proposed to Japan that the portion of
Korea north of the 39th parallel be designed as a neutral zone
to secure Russian interests in Manchuria. But because of loss
in War with Japan, they could not materialize the ambition.
The Soviet Union once again revealed its interests. Their
troops entered Korean territory on August 9, 1945 and by
August 15 had overrun all of Korea north of the 38th parallel.
Due to the Russian entry into the War against Japan on August
9, 1945 and Japan's first offer of surrender on August 10,
1945, U.S. planning had to be abruptly switched from an
invasion strategy to that of occupying the enemy territory and
accepting Japan's surrender. Contrary to the widespread
misconception that the division of Korea was another secret
agreement made either at Yalta or Portsdam, the division of
Korea for accepting Japan's Surrender was later confirmed in
General MacArthur's General Order #1 of September 2, 1945.
This order stated that Japanese forces north of 38th parallel
18
in Korea would surrender to Soviet troops, while those south
of the 38th parallel would surrender to U.S. troops. But at
that time, the occupation of Korea by the Soviet and the U.S.
was regarded as the third betrayal of the Korean people. The
Koreans were deeply aggrieved by this cruel manipulat4on of
their national integrity by the two occupying powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union. Although Koreans realized
soon enough that the decision was not made with malice or
forethought, at least on the part of the United States, they
could find no better word than "brutal" to describe the
externally imposed decision to cut the two along an
arbitrarily established line. But the decision by the U.S.,
of temporary dividing Korea into two zones was based on both
military and political considerations to accept the surrender
of the Japanese forces and to deter the Soviet Union from
taking advantage of political and military vacuum in Korea.
On December 27, 1945, the council of Foreign Ministers
of the U.S., the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concluded
the Moscow Agreement. At this meeting the vague term "in due
course" used in Cairo Declaration, came to mean "a four power
trusteeship for a period of up to five years.
[Ref. 18: p. 67 ]
From the Korean's point of view, the Moscow Agreement
on Korea was regarded as an insult to themselves and as
another form of subjugation from which they had just emerged.
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Because the trusteeship would mean a postponement of Korean
independence and one master(Japan) would be simply replaced by
four new masters (U.S., U.K., CHINA, U.S.S.R.). As a result,
the whole nation staged demonstrations against trusteeship and
in favor of immediate independence.
On January 2, 1946, the communist group in Korea
suddenly changed their attitude and came out in favor of
trusteeship. Overall, North Korea supported a trusteeship and
South Korea opposed this. this was the first crack in the
frozen ice into which the whole nation was to be crowded with
political chaos.
The Joint Commission established by the Moscow
Agreement to take steps for the formation of a provisional
democratic government in Korea held its first meeting on March
20, 1946. But almost immediately was at odds with the Soviets.
The commission itself could not solve the problem.
Certainly, the Koreans viewed the United States in
August 1945 as their friend and liberator, and regenerator of
their hopes and aspirations. However, Koreans were destined to
drink bitter cups once again. Their friend and liberator came
as conqueror, their liberated land became partitioned and
occupied by foreign troops, and the southern half of Korea was
put under an alien military rule again. Korea narrowly escaped
the five year trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but they
witnessed the growth of Cold War in Korea and the emergence of
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two states in their land, each claiming the legitimacy and
jurisdiction over the entire peninsula.
2. The Birth of KOREA
Judging that negotiation must be held at a higher
level if any progress was to be achieved, the U.S., proposed
calling a foreign ministers' conference of itself, Britain,
China and the Soviet Union for the settlement of the Korean
problem. When Russia officially refused to accept this
proposal, the U.S., placed the Korean questions before the
United Nations on September 17, 1947. Unilateral action like
this to refer the Korean question to the U.N. General
Assembly was tantamount to an admission by the United States
of failure in and was a violation by the U.S. of an
international agreement regarding Korea. But this course of
action seemed inevitable and the most promising alternatives
under the circumstances. As one analyst put it "it would place
on the United Nations and its members some of the
responsibility which the United States had hitherto assumed
alone. At the same time , since American security was not
considered to be at stake , no vital interests would be
jeopardized. [Ref. 19: p.29 ]
On September 23, the General Assembly voted to place
the question on its agenda and referred it to the political
and security committee. A few days later, the Soviet
delegation on the Joint commission suggested that Soviet and
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United States troops in Korea be withdrawn simultaneously
"during the beginning of 1948" and that the Koreans be
allowed to organize their own government without outside
assistance. The U.S. delegation contended that such a proposal
was outside the commission's sphere of authority. The Soviet
Foreign Minister communicated the same suggestions to
Secretary of State Marshall on October 9. The U.S. called the
proposal to the attention of the General Assembly. In
addition, Acting Secretary of State Robert A.Lovett informed
the Soviet Foreign Minister that the question of troop
withdrawal from Korea must be considered as an integral part
of the solution of the problem of establishing an independent
government for a Unified Korea.
The General Assembly discussed the Korean question at
its plenary meetings. During the debate the Soviet
Representative, Andrei A. Gromyko, maintained that the Korean
question did not fall within the purview of the United
Nations. Nevertheless, the General Assembly on November 14,
1947, adopted two resolutions, proposed by the United States,
providing for a program for Korean independence.
The U.N. temporary commission on Korea (UNTCOK), which
was established by the General Assembly's action of November
14, 1947, held its first meeting at Seoul on January 12, 1948.
Part of their mission was to set up an elected National
Assembly according to the proportions of the population from
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the two zones, whose members would then be authorized to
establish a national government.
The UNTCOK arrived in Korea on January 8, 1948 and
tried to implement the U.N. resolutions, but Soviet-occupied
North Korea denied the effort. So, the commission decided to
consult the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to
determine whether it was appropriate for the Commission to
implement the Assembly's program in South Korea. The
conclusion of the Interim Committee was embodied in a
resolution which stated that the program set forth in the
Assembly's resolution of November 14, 1947, should be carried
out. Under this resolution UNTCOK proceeded with an election
in South Korea only.
The election was held and observed by UNTCOK, the
result was a victory for the elements under Syngman Rhee. On
August 24, Syngman Rhee signed an interim military agreement
with the U.S. Commander providing for the transfer of
jurisdiction over the security forces to the new government.
The U.S. recognized this new Korean government along with
Nationalist China on August 12. Following the issuance of a
statement on August 12, Washington named John J. Muccio as
its first ambassador to the Korea, and with the inauguration
of the Korea on August 15, 1948, the American military rule
was terminated.
An American spokesman stated in 1948 that the
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inauguration of the Korean Republic was not a final step in
the execution of American commitments to establish a free and
independent Korea, but would have to be followed by economic
assistance of a character which would enable the Republic to
become a "solvent trading partner in the world economy and to
withstand communist ideological penetration from within as
well as attack from without." But, in reality the United
States had no Korean policy other than the prevention of a
collapse of the Korean economy. [Ref. 20: p.19 ]
C. THE KOREAN WAR
1. Withdrawal of U.S. Forces
Shortly after the elections of March 10, 1948, in the
Korea, and one month before the Soviet announcement of
September 18 concerning withdrawal of Soviet troops, the U.S,
seemed to withdraw completely its political and military
commitments from Korea as the Joint Chief Staff had resolved
that "under no circumstances would the U.S. engage in the
military defense of the Korean peninsula. [Ref. 21: p.19 ]
Gen. Albert G. Wedemayer, in his report on China -
Korea to President Truman, warned: [Ref. 22: p.803 ]
The withdrawal of American military forces from Korea
would,in turn result in the occupation of South Korea
either by Soviet troops, or as seems not likely, by the
Korean units trained under Soviet auspices in North
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Korea. The end result would be the creation of a Soviet
satellite communist regime in all of Korea.
Francis B. Stevens, assistant chief of the Division of
Europe Affairs, raised the question of whether the United
States could get out of Korea without losing its prestige.
The United States had the fear that continued lack of progress
toward the Korean question would create a chaotic political
and economic situation, including violent disorder, making the
position of U.S. occupation forces untenable. " A precipitous
withdrawal of U.S. forces under such circumstances would lower
the military prestige of the United States, quite possibly to
the extent of adversely affecting cooperation in other areas
more vital to the security of the United States."
Furthermore, the United States was convinced that the Soviet
proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation forces at
the beginning of 1948, " would lead to the early establishment
of a dictatorship in Korea. Precisely for this reasons, the
U.S. objected to the Soviet proposal for withdrawal, made at
the Joint U.S.- Soviet Commission in September 1947.
[Ref. 23: p.883 ]
The Government of Korea thought that such withdrawal
was inadvisable before its own security forces had adequate
preparation for defense. Consequently, on November 20, 1948,
the National Assembly of the ROK passed a resolution to
request that the U.S. postpone its troop withdrawal until the
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security forces of the public were capable of maintaining
order. Leaving Korea to its own fate prior to reaching an
agreement on Korea in the United Nations would be tantamount
to U.S., abandonment of Korea. Thus, the decision of withdrawal
was postponed until 1948 when the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the U.S. draft resolution calling for mutual
withdrawal of occupation forces as early as possible.
In April 1949, the U.S. believed that the capability
of the Korean defense forces warranted the withdrawal of U.S.
troops in a matter of months. So, the first contingent of
American troops left Korea in May. But soon after the initial
withdrawal of U.S. forces, the situation in the new Republic
deteriorated due to armed insurrections and daily surging
domestic turmoil. Under these circumstances, the State
Department argued that "the complete withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Korea at this time would seriously jeopardize the
security and stability of the Government of Korea! [Ref. 24:
p.1338 ]
However, the State Department recognized that the
continued retention of U.S. forces entailed the risk of being
forced to choose between military involvement and precipitate
withdrawal in the event of War in Korea, so recommended that
the withdrawal decision be reconsidered. But the Department
of Army, favoring early withdrawal, presented the following
views: (Ref. 25: pp.1342-1343 ]
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(1) The U.S. has little strategic interests in
maintaining its troops and bases.
(2) The Army made no budgetary provisions for the retention
of troops beyond Fiscal Year 1949.
(3) The ability of ROK forces to cope with internal
disorders minimizes the need for future retenticn of
U.S.forces.
(4) The mission assigned U.S. forces prohibits involvement
in actions precipitated by any fraction or any other
power which could be considered a casus belli for the
U.S.
The disagreement on the timing of total withdrawal
between the Department of State and Army was finally solved
when President Truman approved the March 22, 1949 report
calling for the completion of withdrawal of the remaining U.S.
forces no later than June 30, 1949. So, despite strong
objections of the Korean Government, the U.S.withdrew its
troops from Korea by 29 June, 1949, leaving behind poorly
indoctrinated, trained, and supplied soldiers of the newly
created Korean Army and a small U.S. Military Advisory Group
only to return one year later. Thus, for the first time in a
half-a-century, the Koreans were left alone by big powers, in
spite of the fact that the country was divided into two
hostile forces along the 38th parallel.
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2. U.S. Intervention
Despite the declaration of U.S. support for the ROK,
statesman and actions of U.S. in early 1950 gave the
impression to the international community that the U.S.. would
not stand altogether behind the Government of South of Korea.
The major facts that illustrate this weakening of U.S.
supports are U.S. troop withdrawal and Secretary
Acheson's(infamous) speech. He told a Congressional Committee
that the " American line of defense in the Far East extends
from Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and Okinawa to
the Philippines, [Ref. 26:p.19 ] and made no mention of
Korea. In his remarks of January 12, 1950 in a speech before
the National Press Club, he reiterated that the United States
defense perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan, and from
Japan to the Philippines, and again he made no reference to
Korea. This completely excluded Korea from the defensive
perimeter of the U.S. In addition, when he mentioned Korea,
he reinforced the notion that Korea was outside this perimeter
of military action by noting that we had ended our military
occupation of that country. His remarks clearly implied that
the ROK was placed outside the U.S. defense perimeter. What
was new in his remarks was that "so far as the military
security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must
be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against
military attack.' [Ref. 27: p.70 ]
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Probably for these remarks, North Korea seems to have
been encouraged to embark upon its military invasion against
the South, convincing itself that there would be no military
involvement by the United States in case of a full-scale
invasion. The North Korea apparently had taken his remarks at
face value. What was miscalculated by the North Korean
leadership was a new U.S. military and diplomatic approach
toward Korea.
Contrary to the general belief that Acheson was going
to abandon Korea, Secretary Acheson later emphasized :
[Ref. 28: P.116 1
We have given that nation (Korea ) great help in getting
itself established. We are asking Congress to continue
this help until it is firmly established, and that
legislation is now pending before Congress. The idea that
we should scrap all of that, that we should stop halfway
through the achievement of the establishment of this
country, seems to me to be the most utter defeatism and
utter madness in our interests in Asia.
John Foster Dulles made a more precise statement
before the ROK National Assembly on June 19, 1950. In it, he
said: [Ref. 29: p.35 )
Already the United States has twice intervened with
armed might in defense of freedom when it was hard pressed
by unprovoked military aggression. We were not bound by
any treaty to do this. We did so because the American
people are faithful to the cause of human freedom, and
loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it.
...You are not alone, You will never be alone, as long as
you continue to play worthily your part in the great
design of human freedom.
This assurance by Dulles came too late for the North
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Koreans to change their plan for military action. Anyway,
North Koreans launched an unprovoked attack on all fronts of
the 38th parallel on Sunday morning, 25 June 1950, in an
effort to reunify Korea under communist domination, equipped
with Soviet arms and trained by the Chinese, North Koreans
stormed the South, crushing the unprepared South Korean Army
and gaining an important initial strategic advantage in the
War.
In retrospect, the invasion by North Korea might have
been prevented if Acheson had made it clear that Korea had the
deterrent value of defending in East Asia. In another respect,
if the U.S. had dropped Korea in the face of aggression, the
worldwide political, economic and military impact would have
been enormous. Japan, which the United States values most in
Asia in political, economic and strategic terms, could have
been forced to swing into the Soviet camp for fear of
aggression which, alone, it could not resist. In Europe, the
North Atlantic Treaty organization would not have been given
a powerful impetus to its military build-up and its political
solidarity. Among other things, the U.S. could have lost its
worldwide credibility, weakening the confidence of those who
count on the United States.
3. Armistice
The relaxing of tensions culminated, on July 23, 1951,
almost one year after the fighting had originated, with Jacob
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Malik, the Soviet representative to the U.N. Security Council,
hinting the negotiations on the Korean Armistice could be
started. In response, U.S. General Ridgway issued an
invitation to the Communists on June 30, suggesting that
cease-fire talks be initiated. It is significant that this
invitation was extended in spite of President Lee's vehement
opposition to any negotiation prior to unification of Korea.
Syngman Lee and the people of South Korea were adamant
to any arrangement short of the unification of Korea. As early
as May 26, 1951, the Lee government had announced that it
would continue fighting alone if any truce did not provide for
the unification of Korea. Thenceforth, President Lee mobilized
the people in support of the cause and denounced the truce at
the 38th parallel as "another Munich appeasement.
[Ref. 30: p.588]
On December 2, 1952, President Eisenhower visited
Korea and promised military and economic assistance to South
Korea if President Lee would agree to accept an armistice to
end the fighting. But Lee would not accept any end to the
fighting which left Korea a divided nation, and threatened to
remove all ROK forces from the U.N. Command.
On July 30, 1951, the South Korean government put five
conditions for a cease-fire: (1) the complete withdrawal of
the Chinese Communists from Korea; (2) the complete
disarmament of the North Korean Communists;(3) a U.N.
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guarantee to prevent any third power from giving assistance to
North Korea; (4) the full participation of ROK representatives
in any international conference or meeting discussing the
Korean problem; (5) no arrangement undermining the
administrative sovereignty and territorial integrity of Korea.
To soothe South Korean opposition, the American government
instructed that a senior ROK officer be nominated as a UNC
representative. So, Major General Paik Sun Yup and Major
General Kang Mun Bong were selected as the ROK representative.
At that time, Senator Alexander Smith of New Jersey
asked whether the South Korean commander in the field would
have a voice in deciding the matter of a cease-fire. Dean
Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, replied:[Ref.31: p.589]
General Ridgway's representative will be accompanied by
a senior Korean officer, who will not be a full pleni-
potentiary, along with General Ridgway's representative.
If the issues were not so important we might concede him
the status of full equal, but we feel that our national
interests are so great here that we might have Ridgway's
representative as the No. 1 man representing the U.N.
side, and the other man would be there as his assistant,
and would be allowed to say something if he wanted to ,
but there would be no question as to his status. He would
be assisting General Ridgway's representative.
It was the decision of the American government that
the United Nations and the United States would ignore the
opposition and the participation of the South Koreans in the
negotiating process, except letting them say something.
A U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty first and an
armistice next was the basic aim of President Lee. On June 2,
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1953, Lee sent a letter to President Eisenhower, offering a
public pledge to accept the armistice on the condition that a
mutual security pact first be concluded, one that would be
provide for continuing U.S. military aid and immediate
military intervention in case of renewed aggression and a
possible crusade to unify Korea.
Eventually, Lee accepted the inevitability of a UNC
armistice under strong pressure from General Clark and
President Eisenhower, but he nevertheless attempted to fight
on alone. At any rate, the devastating War in Korea was
brought to an end, thanks to a high price paid by the U.S., and
other nations which repelled the aggression, with the signing
of the Korean Armistice on July 27, 1953. But Syngman Rhee,
ROK President, was strongly opposed to an armistice which left
Korea divided, denouncing the prospective ceasefire as a
"death sentence" to the ROK. He reluctantly agreed to a
ceasefire only after the U.S. promised him the following:
[Ref.32: p.359 ]
(1) Promise of a mutual security pact.
(2) Assurance of long-term economic aid, with an initial
installment of $200 million.
'3) Agreement to implement the planned expansion of the ROK
Army to 20 divisions with modest increases in the navy
and air force.
(4) Withdrawal from the political conference after 90 days.
Following the signing of the Armistice Agreement, the
16 nations participating in the U.N. Command in Korea met in
Washington and issued a declaration which supported the
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conclusion of an armistice and expressed their determination
to carry out its terms "fully and faithfully." They declared
that they would resist any renewal of aggression by the
communists, warned that renewed hostilities probably could not
be confined "within the frontiers of Korea," and pledged to
support future U.N. efforts to bring about an equitable
settlement in Korea.[Ref.33: p.28 ) Also after the
armistice, a joint statement was issued by the United States
and Korea in which they pledged continued cooperation and
agreed that in the political conference of the signatories of
the Armistice which was to follow within three months,
according to the terms in the Korean armistice, they would
seek to achieve the peaceful unification of historic Korea as
a free and independent nation. They added that if it appeared,
after ninety days, that attempts to achieve mutual objectives
were fruitless, both countries would make a concurrent
withdrawal from the conference and then would consult further
regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent
Korea.
President Lee met Secretary Dulles five times in
August to discuss the political conference, economic and
military aid, and the mutual defense treaty. President Lee's
dependence on the treaty for the defense of South Korea was
almost total. He wanted the treaty for South Korea's
protection not only against the Communists but also against
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the Japanese. Therefore, his objective was to make the treaty
as strong and immediate as possible in its implementation. On
the other hand, Secretary Dulles did not wish to relinquish
his government's freedom of action in executing its foreign
policy. The Secretary solemnly advised the President of the
importance of having a treaty to which the U.S., senate could
give overwhelming consent. Difference derived from the fact
that Dulles was talking based on the concerns and needs of a
great power, while Lee was negotiating as a leader of a weak,
small nation with nothing left but a seeming ability to
expedite or disrupt the armistice.
President Lee strove very hard to make the treaty as
strong and immediate as possible with automatic implementation
and indefinite duration. However, the secretary's
intransigence on making the treaty viable and acceptable to
the United States prevailed over the president's insistence
on a NATO-type pact. In the end, Lee judged that it was
mandatory for him to settle soon for some type of treaty with
the U.S., for the security of South Korea.
At last the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed at
Washington on October 1, 1953. Under Article III of the
treaty, each nation recognized that "an armed attack in the
Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under
their respective administrative control, or hereafter
recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the
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administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety" and declared that "it would act to meet
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes. During the discussion of the treaty in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, concern was expressed over the
possibility that this article might commit the U.S. to give
aid if the ROK tried to expand its control over North Korea
by military or other unlawful means. The Committee therefore
recommended, and the Senate approved, a statement declaring
that it was the understanding of the United States that the
obligations of this article applied only in event of external
armed attack and that the treaty should not be construed as
requiring American assistance "except in the event of armed
attack against territory which has been recognized by the U.S.,
as lawfully brought under the administrative to control of the
R.O.K. [Ref.34: p.30)
By this act, the United States assumed unilateral
responsibility for the security of South Korea, an obligation
which it had been more than reluctant to accept ever since its
temporary occupation began in the aftermath of the Pacific War
of 1941-1945.
In retrospect, contrary to the spirit and letters of
the joint statement of August 7, 1953, the U.S. failed to
consult further regarding the attainment of a unified, free
and independent Korea. Be that as it may, the uneasy truce in
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Korea was maintained for half a century, although unending
border clashes and bloody events have occurred across the 150-
mile truce line. On the other hand, the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the Republic of Korea and the United States opened a
new era in relations between the two countries. The U.S. had
tried to avoid sole responsibility for the defense of South
Korea since its temporary occupation of half of Korea,
designed to facilitate the Japanese surrender after the
Pacific War. Because of its reluctance, the U.S.
internationalized the Korean issue. Even after the Korean war.
it wanted to be only one of many nations to issue a
declaration of greater sanctions against any resumption of
Communist adventure in Korea. The South Korean government
under Lee, on the other hand, badly wanted some form of
unilateral U.S. commitment to the security of South Korea. In
a sense, Lee succeeded by using "suicidal strategy" in
handling the U.S. unilateral responsibility for the safety of
Korea. The relationship still remains a hostage of the
strategic balance on the Korean peninsula. Thus, the
understanding reached at the end of the war and based on the
Korean version of "a substitute for victory"--the mutual
defense treaty--has proved very significant.
Regarding American responsibilities toward Korea, a
long-term Korean specialist Professor Robert T. Oliver said
that " The security of South Korea is a moral obligation for
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the United States because it was our President Franklin D.
Roosevelt who, in early 1945, decided to invite Russia into
the Korean peninsula... Furthermore, it was only upon
Roosevelt's insistence that the projected restoration of
Korean independence to follow Japan's defeat was postponed and
subjected to an awkward and unworkable plan to place Korea
under a four-power trusteeship... What eventuated was the 38th
parallel division of Korea, which led to the Korean War and
which poses continuing danger to the peace of the world."
[Ref. 35: p.22 ]
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III. RELATIONS SINCE THE KOREAN CONFLICT
A. ROK PRESIDENT LEE'S PERIOD (1953 - 1960)
Despite last ditch efforts on the part of President Lee to
wreck negotiations, the Korean Armistice was signed on July
27, 1953. A few days later a mutual defense treaty between the
United States and Korea was signed. The treaty promised that
"the parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of
either, their political independence or security is threat-
ened' It also stated in Article II that the parties will
"maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed
attack! But, the treaty made it clear that each party would
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitu-
tional processes(Article III). But when the Senate passed the
U.S.-Korean mutual defense treaty in 1954, it attached an
understanding clause in which it required "the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States to implement
Article II and III! This clause also made it clear that the
obligation under Article III applied only in the event of an
external armed attack.[Ref.36: pp.270-273]
In short, under the terms of the mutual defense treaty, the
United States has no obligation to help South Korea when South
Korea itself initiates hostilities. Obviously, the U.S.
attempted to eliminate any implication that the unification of
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Korea through military action could be undertaken with the
assistance of U.S. armed forces.
According to Article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, within
three months after the signing of the armistice a political
conference was to be held which would settle the problem of
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, as well as the
problem of Korean unification. However, the opening of the
conference appeared no more imminent than it had prior to the
armistice.
After signing of the armistice in July 1953, the South
Korean government attempted to discourage U.S. efforts to reach
an agreement with the communists for the convening of a
political conference, which eventually met, however, in the
spring of 1954 in Geneva. South Korea initially refused to
participate in the conference because it did not see the
usefulness of negotiating with the communists to begin with,
and particularly because of the inclusion of the Soviet Union.
Once again, the U.S. had to bargain to get South Korea
cooperation. It promised to help strengthen the ROK army
greatly, and to see that the U.S. delegates in the conference
would stand firm on the unification of Korea under a
democratic government. If the United States had failed to lead
South Korea to the Geneva conference, it would have been
blamed by the world for the conference's failure. Hence it
agreed to South Korea's new demands, increasing U.S.
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responsibility for Korea's security.
The few months before the armistice and the period before
the collapse of the Geneva conference marks the peaks of
Syngman Ree's power in affecting U.S. foreign policy. Ree's
power was negative in nature. It existed most effectively in
times of crisis. His threats were most probably a means to
wage his constant struggle to prevent the world from forgett-
ing South Korean problems. As the immediate crisis passed,
such power would no longer play a major role in South Korea's
relations with the United States.
Ree also had great misgivings about what he considered a
"relaxation of tensions" policy that marked the Eisenhower
presidency. He told the U.S. public: [Ref. 37: p.206 ]
While we dream, hope and plan for peace, the Communists
talk and talk, distracting us from what they are doing
behind the Iron Curtain. And what have they been doing?
They have been building up the largest army in the world,
the largest air force, the largest fleet of submarines,
and have developed their atomic and hydrogen bombs... If
we continue to sit still and ignore the enemy's act
because we want to believe his words, there probably will
not be any war -- or if there is, it will be a short one.
But we will not like the outcome. To win real peace in the
world, we'll have to fight for it.
Even during the 1950s, Ree's strong cold-war rhetoric did
not sit well with the U.S. public, who regarded his remarks as
inflammatory and designed to involve the United States in a
dangerous confrontation with the Soviet Union for South Korean
self-interest.
President Ree was much more successful in warding off what
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might be considered U.S. interference in Korea's domestic
affairs. Although the United States viewed the deterioration
of democratic politics under Ree with dismay, it showed
constraint in dealing with the Ree government on these issues.
During the Korean War, the United States was most interested
in an early restoration of political stability in Korea and
seems to have feared that, if pushed too hard, the president
might provoke incidents that would jeopardize the objective of
putting an early end to the war. Even after the war, Ree was
considered to be the best hope for stability and order in
Korea. Even if the U.S. government had wished to bring about
a change in the Korean political scene, interference would
only have resulted in turning President Ree further against
the United States.
It was not until April, 1954, that an agreement was
reached to meet in Geneva with U.S. participation in this new
conference to be dominated by the reality that as long as
Korea remained divided, the possibility of another war
existed. In other words, the United States saw the Geneva
Conference as the best opportunity to unify Korea by peaceful
means, which in turn would eliminate any possibility of forced
American involvement in another war.
Delegations from the United Nations command, including The
ROK, met with delegations from the Soviet Union, Communist
China, and North Korea. Problems arose immediately over
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whether or not elections should be conducted by secret ballot
under the supervision of the U.N. The North Korea, with the
support of China and Soviet Union, refused to accept U.N.
supervision on the grounds that the United Nations was a
belligerent party in the Korean War and had lost the moral
authority and competence to deal with Korean unification.
Instead, its delegates proposed acceptance of the Communist
Chinese position of elections supervision by a commission
composed of neutral nations. What was at stake was not merely
Korean unification but the authority and competence of the
United Nations.
For two months conference members haggled over what
constituted correct solutions to the Korean question.
Agreement could not be reached on several issues: (1)
Supervision of an all-Korean election, (2) Withdrawal of
foreign troops, (3) Extent of U.N. Authority, and (4)
Allowance of a veto over the unification process. Unable to
resolve these vital issues, the conference adjourned on June
15, 1954, without solving the question of unification which is
of the most concern to Koreans.
After the war, the United Nations became the last real
hope for Korean unification. Yet, U.S. manipulation of the
U.N. during the war for its own purposes had set a precedent
which would continue to prevent realization of this hope. The
United States first sought approval for its actions in Korea,
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and then solicited acceptance of a number of resolutions
which, in reality, represented an abuse rather than proper
utilization of the United Nations. In all likelihood, the U.S.
could have done as well militarily in Korea without reliance
upon the U.N. because with the exception of small British,
Australian, and Turkish contingents, actions in Korea were
conducted by U.S. military forces mainly. Thus, to the Soviet
and Chinese, the U.N. was only a facade which provided the
U.S. with an international shield for its own policy
objectives. Meanwhile, in August of 1953, after the Armistice
had been signed, the Soviets called for admission of the
Chinese and North Korea into discussions concerning the
Korean question. The Soviet Union had no intention of seeing
North Korea fall from the sphere of its influence, while the
United States had equally no intention of losing South Korea
as a buffer against Chinese and Soviet expansion. The
unification of Korea had by now become overwhelmed by
political and military realities of the cold war.
Hereafter, all efforts of the U.S. toward Korea
concentrated on preventing the Armistice Agreement from
forcing another war and on the restoration of the war-wrecked
Korean economy. As a result, during this period of 1953-1958,
the U.S., government provided South Korea with more than 1.3
billion dollars in economic aid, and it was during this period
of heavy financial outlay that the U.S. ignored an April, 1956
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Communist Chinese note, sent via the British, which requested
a conference to consider the withdrawal of all foreign troops
from Korea. [Ref. 38: p.78]
On the whole, Syngman Ree, despite his U.S-centered
foreign policy, proved to be a tough bargainer as far as the
United States was concerned. He persistently and loudly argued
for a tough stand against the communists, for a stronger U.S.
security commitment and more economic aid for Korea, and
against the establishment of too-close ties between the United
States and Japan. As a result of his uncompromising and
hawkish attitude, Ree probably compromised much of his
diplomatic effectiveness.
During the Kennedy administration there were no basic
changes in U.S. policy toward the reunification of Korea via
United Nations machinery. Even though the U.S. has regularly
presented the issue of Korean reunification in the United
Nations, the American policy toward Korea in the 1960's was
geared toward creating a South Korean government capable of
withstanding Communist subversion.
The short-run goal of Kennedy's policy initially seems to
have been to maintain strong, pro-American government on the
frontiers of Communism and also one of the ultimate objectives
was to establish a viable and democratic government in South
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Korea, one which could bargain from a position of equal
strength with North Korea should unification become a reality.
However, American policy was not primarily directed toward the
immediate reunification of Korea.
B. PRESIDENT PARK'S PERIOD (1961 - 1979)
1. THE MILITARY REVOLUTION
The Chang Myon interregnum that followed the rule of
Sungman Lee was the democratic period in South Korea's
political history. Newspapers proliferated, politicians
scrambled for position, and political demonstrators marched
daily through the streets of Seoul. Under such circumstances,
the adoption and execution of effective policies were impos-
sible. Industrial production declined, unemployment increased
and prices rose rapidly. Dissatisfaction mounted, especially
within the armed forces, until the military brought down the
Chang Myon government by a military coup in May 1961, after
only nine months in office.
After a military revolutionary group announced it had
seized power from the Premier, the United States Embassy in
Seoul issued a statement on Tuesday, May 16, expressing strong
support for the "freely elected and constitutionally
established Government" of Premier Chang.[Ref. 39:p.100)
A military rule was distinctly repugnant to Americans and the
new Kennedy Administration. During the military coup, the
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United Nations Command was seriously weakened in prestige when
the military junta supporting General Park utilized
unilaterally some Korean armed forces units, technically
under U.N. Command, in support of the take-over action.
But there was a tendency in some Administration
circles to criticize the action of the United States Embassy
in Seoul and the U.S. military commander in Korea for having
issued statements on May 16 in support of Chang Government and
critical of military officers who seized power. The main
question appeared to be not what they had said so much as why
they had issued statements without clearing them first with
Washington.[Ref. 40: p.101]
The revolutionary committee announced a six-item
statement, in which it emphasized anti-communism and the
promotion of friendly relations with the United States.
Officials in Washington were hopeful on May 18 that political
authority in South Korea would be returned quickly to civilian
hands, because the U.S. worried about that the intrusion of
military men into civilian affairs would become an established
pattern in South Korea. The tradition of separation of the
military from politics had been cultivated assiduously in
South Korea by every United States military commander there
since the establishment of the Korea in 1948.
Prolonged efforts of persuasion and pressure were
directed at General Park to restore civilian government to
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hold elections. At first, the Chairman responded that "such
pressure from the American government for a transfer of power
would greatly increase military leaders against the United
States." Ambassador Berger countered by warning that "any
anti-American movement or action would not be treated lightly
by American authorities." [Ref.41:p.104]
The Kennedy Administration threatened Park to terminate not
only economic aid but also military aid. Chairman Park,
embroiled in an internal power struggle among the members of
the military revolutionary regime and pressure from the United
States, was forced to change his stand on the return of the
government to civilian rule several times.
By mid-July, 1961, American attitudes toward the
military junta began to change; the U.S. decided to accept the
coup and to work with the new military government. This change
may have been due to the realization on the part of U.S., that
continued negative reaction to the issue of viability of the
military junta would inevitably translate into increased
confusion, and possibly bloodshed, in South Korea. If the
economic and political environment deteriorated to too great
an extent, there was an imminent danger of another North
Korean attack. Under these circumstances, a joint statement
was issued on July 7, 1961 by a representative of the military
junta and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, wherein friendship and
cooperation were reaffirmed. Subsequently, in a statement on
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July 28, Rusk stated that the U.S. welcomed "the vigorous and
prompt step that the military government has taken in its
efforts to root out corruption and to provide a firmer base
for democracy.[Ref. 42 : pp.93-121]
At any rate, the American pressure resulted in the
holding of presidential elections on October 15, 1963 which
Park won by a narrow margin over former President Yoon Po Sun.
The United States then encouraged President Park to follow the
example of his predecessor Yoon in constructing a
democratically representative government.
On the other hand, concerning the role which the
United States played in Korea after 1945, particularly in 1961
at the time when a military coup had taken place in South
Korea, Professor Wagner remarked that "The United States has
not taken an intelligent approach to the basic problem of
seeking an understanding of the land and its people. Seldom
has such a massive presence of one nation in another been
accomplished by such massive ignorance"., [Ref. 43: p. 21) In
his opinion, a policy of drift and shirking the
responsibilities of the United States, in addition to the lack
of knowledge and understanding of the land and the people on
the part of Americans, were the major factors which
contributed to American failure in Korea.
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2. ROK participation in the Vietnam War
The two main diplomatic developments for South Korea
during the 1960s were, first, the diplomatic normalization
between South Korea and Japan in 1965 and, second, the
dispatch of South Korean combat troops to Vietnam in the
second half of the decade.
Diplomatic normalization with Japan sought the Korean
government as a means of expanding Korea's foreign relations
beyond the relationship with the United States and of bringing
pragmatic realism into Korea's foreign policy.
In this undertaking, the U.S. itself was instrumental. In the
hope that friendship and cooperation between South Korea and
Japan would lessen the U.S. defense burden in East Asia, the
United States encouraged normalization talks for the two
governments. Even though the normalization contributed to
reduce the dependence of South Korea on U.S., South Korea
continued to remain totally dependent on the United States for
its security.
As American military involvement in Vietnam expanded
President Johnson decided to request the sending of Korean
troops to Vietnam. A message to that effect was sent to
President Park on July 25, 1965. Park responded on July 29
that Korea was willing to send troops and that the National
Assembly, again without the participation of opposition
legislators, approved the move on August 13, 1965.
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The normalization of relations with Japan and the
dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam, moves welcomed and
encouraged by the U.S., helped to improve the relations
between the ountries. Korea was the only country to send
combat trool- Vietnam besides the United States. The South
Korean dispz f combat troops to Vietnam can be understood
as a producz. ol its alliance relationship with the United
States. Korea sent troops to Vietnam not as an ally of South
Vietnam, but as an ally of the United States. It is known that
South Korea had a strong interests in preventing a communist
victory and U.S. defeat in Indochina.
Commenting on the motives for Korea's dispatch of
combat forces to South Vietnam, Chyun Sang-jin, former ROK
vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote:
[Ref. 44:p.54]
The ROK's voluntary dispatch of its armed forces to
Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people uphold their
independence a - sovereignty was prompted by bitter
experience duri..g the Korean War and lessons it learned
from international cooperation. The resolute action was
also based on its own apprehension of situation and on the
call of conscience. This is not at all an offensive
involvement for war but a defensive involvement for
peace. The action was firmly based on the belief that
peace can in no circumstances be achieved through
appeasement only, but that a proper exercise of strength
is inevitable to preserve peace.
The foremost reason for South Korea's decision to send
troops to Vietnam was to be found in its desire to prevent the
weakening of the U.S. security commitment in Korea. U.S.
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military assistance to Korea had been getting progressively
smaller, down to $124 million in FY 1964(1963-1964), an all-
time low since 1956. The average amount of annual U.S.
military aid, which had been $232 millic uring the FY 1956-
1961 period, dropped to $154 million the FY 1962-1965
period. Advanced military equipment tha id been promised to
the armed forces was not forthcoming on s-hedule.
[Ref.45: p.209 ]
Most significantly, there were reports of U.S. plans
for a possible transfer to Vietnam of one or more divisions of
Korea-based U.S. troops in the event that additional troops
from U.S. allies were not available for combat. For this
reason, a promise from the United States that it would not
reduce its troop levels in Korea was the major concession
sought by the Korean government during negotiations leading to
the dispatch of the first Korean combat troops to Vietnam.
This decision was to have a major impact on U.S.- South Korean
relations because it gave South Korea a greater degree of
self-confidence in relations with the United States and an
expanded role in Asia's international politics. Until 1965,
South Korea had been essentially an isolated, passive
international entity depending almost exclusively on the
United States for international recognition and diplomatic
activities. The situation began to change markedly after the
arrival of the first South Korean combat troops in Vietnam.
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Once it became actively involved in Vietnam, South Korea began
to press on the United States its views about how the Vietnam
conflict should be resolved. Fearing possible U.S.
appeasement, Korean government urged the United States to
strive for a military victory and reject any peace that
signified appeasement.
South Korea's increasing assertiveness toward the
United States was most clearly shown in its refusal to send
more troops to Vietnam despite repeated and urgent requests,
initially made by President Johnson during his visit in
November 1966 and repeated through Vietnam's Premier Nguyen
Kao Ky in January 1967. One indication of Seoul's increased
bargaining power with the United States was its extraordinary
success in obtaining large sums of military aid during the
years following the dispatch of combat troops to Vietnam.
Total U.S. military aid to Korea had been $815 million between
FY 1961 and FY 1965, but in 1971 South Korea reluctantly
accepted the U.S. plan to reduce its troop level in Korea
from 63,000 to 43,000 only after securing a promise from
Washington that it would support a five-year program to
modernize the Korean armed forces at an estimated cost of $1.5
billion. [Ref. 46: p.211 ]
South Korea entered the Vietnam conflict with the
primary purpose of preventing the withdrawal or weakening of
the U.S. security commitment in Korea. Also, there was a deep
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sense of moral obligation in Korean conscience because of the
aid given by the United States to Korea during the Korean con-
flict. This is evidenced by the fact that in September 1964
when the National Assembly unanimously voted for a dispatch
of a group of self-defense instructors and a medical team.
There was also growing criticism among opposition
political forces in the National Assembly on the decision of
overextending military commitment. The controversy over
military commitment reached its peak in early 1966 when the
ROK cabinet decided to send additional combat troops. The
opposition forces argued that the pulling out of 49,000 troops
would jeopardize the security of Korea and that such a move
might include a similar counter-action by North Korea on
behalf of Hanoi, thus increasing the chance of renewed North-
South conflict in Korea.
In making this decision which would affect the
security of Korea, the ROK government was most probably
motivated by the following factors. Firstly, the government
was motivated to forestall the redeployment to Vietnam of the
remaining U.S. combat troops. A second factor was to further
strengthen a ROK security position by obtaining a guarantee
for the U.S. automatic and immediate response in case of
aggression. A third inducement was to modernize the ROK armed
forces through U.S. military and economic assistance programs.
A major negative effect of South Korea's involvement in the
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Vietnam was the escalation of tensions along the DMZ. The
armed provocations of North Korea on land and sea in and near
the DMZ and the infiltration into the ROK of armed agents were
further intensified with each passing day in parallel with an
increase of ROK troops in Vietnam.
Throuah its Vietnam experience, South Korea became
aware of U.S. weaknesses and limitations to its power. Doubt
about U.S. military credibility also increased with the North
Korean seizure of U.S. intelligence ship 'Pueblo' in January
1968 and a U.S. response that the South Korean government
considered inadequate. The U.S. failure to act forcefully in
the Pueblo affairs, as well as its refusal to permit the South
Korean army to strike back in retaliation for the North Korean
assassination attempt on President Park in January 1968,
raised questions about the U.S. determination to repel
aggression in Korea if it ever became necessary.
3. NIXON AND FORD DOCTRINE
When President Nixon took office in 1969, he was aware
of growing congressional and popular dissatisfaction in the
U.S., with containment in general, and with the role of the
United States as "world policeman" in particular. The result
was the famous "Guam Doctrine," later known as the "Nixon
Doctrine," which signaled the beginning of a process that was
to significantly affect America's military posture in Asia.
Nixon announced a new policy toward Asia pledging that
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the U.S. would not automatically be involved in a new war in
Asia. The foundation of this policy was a balance of power.
This policy balanced a psuedo-alliance system among the U.S.,
Japan, and China against an equally psuedo-alliance system
composed of the U.S., Japan, and the Soviet Union, allowing
that U.S. the ability to play one off the other and to enjoy
a dominant position without risk of war and without a large
military presence in East Asia. Nixon's later decision for
Sino-American detente comes from this balancing scheme.
Confronting the Nixon Doctrine, South Korean leaders
began to lose confidence in the American commitment to South
Korea. As Professor Edwin 0. Reischauer rightly pointed
out,"Unfortunately, the doctrine has been made to sound like
a concept applying to an Asia that is alien to the United
States that it is not worthy of defense at the cost of
American lives. "Asian boys should fight Asian wars" and
presumably the Koreans should not count on American defense
commitments. To implement this doctrine in 1970, the Nixon
Administration began negotiating in Seoul for the withdrawal
of a large part of the American forces within two or three
years. [Ref. 47: p.84]
To assuage any doubts the South Koreans might have
harbored at the time, the American commitment to help South
Korea defend themselves from external attack was reiterated in
early 1969 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. Testifying
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before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Mr. Laird stated:
[Ref. 48: p.100 ]
Regardless of the form of our assistance, its basic
objectives have remained the same: to insure that our
countries either individually or collectively, have the
necessary military capability to deter aggression and,
failing this, to withstand an armed attack until
supporting forces arrive.
By the end of 1971, the U.S., had withdrawn one of the
two American divisions remaining in Korea, although the move
met with the vehement protest of the South Korean government.
In an attempt to compensate the Koreans, the Administration
sought an appropriation of a billion dollars, spread over five
years to modernize the South Korean army. One implication of
a give-and-take policy of this type is that the U.S.,may have
been planning to buy its way out rather than simply to leave
Korea. The modernization program apparently was aimed at
assuring South Korea a defense capability against the North,
but not an offensive capability.
As a last ditch effort to restrict U.S. forces
withdrawal, South Korean leaders urged that the U.S. relocate
its Okinawa bases in South Korea, should Okinawa revert to
Japan, and at the same time threatened to withdraw all Korean
forces from South Vietnam. The Nixon administration, however,
seemed determined to withdraw American troops from Asia and to
follow a policy of disengagement, thus negating all Korean
attempts to assure the long-term presence of U.S. troops on
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South Korea.
These events were followed by a series of shocking
international changes in the Asian scene. That is the
admission of Communist China into the U.N. expelling Taiwan,
Kisenger's secret trip to China, and Nixon's own trip to
China, all announced without consultation with Korea and
Japan. Also we find a new economic polemic developing between
the U.S. and Japan, the result being that Japanese exports
into the U.S. were curtailed. This limitation was equally
applied to South Korean exports into the United States. These
events intensified a long-standing fear entertained by Korean
leaders that the U.S., and Japan might arrange a reapproachment
with China and Russia without their knowledge, leaving Korea
isolated from the rest of Asia. [Ref. 49: p.85]
After the decision to reduce U.S. troops in Korea from
63,000 to 43,000, the U.S. shifted a wing of 54 phantom F-4
fighter bombers from Japan to station them permanently in
South Korea, and proposed special budget request of $1.5
billion over a five-year period for Korean force
modernization. This move is a clear reflection of the altered
concept of a U.S. defence posture in Korea embodied in the
Nixon Doctrine. The scenarios of this concept are: (1) with
the reinforcement of U.S. Air Force and expanded military
assistance programs, ROK forces can provide their own ground
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troops to counter a North Korean invasion which does not
involve any outside forces and (2) in a future Asian
conflict, if it does not involve China, there is a possibility
that the U.S. may intervene with the use of tactical nuclear
weapons.
A major effect of this new U.S. deferse posture was
seen in a five-year modernization program for the ROK armed
forces. An important part of this program was the transfer of
excess material to the ROK government. By June 1972, the
United States transferred approximately $95 million of
equipment from withdrawing U.S. troops and excess defence
articles.
The principal difference between the Nixon Doctrine
and the Ford Pacific Doctrine was in President Ford's pledge
of continued America's active concern for Asia and presence in
the Asian Pacific region. Far from retreating in disgrace
after defeat in Indochina, President Ford affirmed a U.S.
obligation to take a leading part in lessening tensions,
preventing hostilities and preserving peace. This affirmation
reflects a firm U.S. determination to stay in Asia in its
guest for an Asian peace and stability.
The primary goal of the Ford Doctrine was to prevent
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the outbreak of a second Vietnam war in a region where the
U.S. has fought three costly wars since 1941. President Ford
believed that this could be achieved by buttressing U.S.
allies in Asia on one hand, while cooperating with China on
the other.
C. KOREA AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
1. THE KOREA GATE
During the 1970s South Korea's primary concern was
over the possibility of a significant reduction in the U.S.,
military presence in Asia, particularly as a result of U.S.
setbacks in Vietnam. South Korea tried to cope with the
problem in three ways: by persuading U.S. policy makers to
maintain their military presence in Korea with pleas, publici-
ty campaigns, and reasoned arguments; by strengthening its own
military capabilities through self reliance as well as through
U.S. assistance; and by trying to bring about a stabilization
of the Korean situation through diplomatic means by initiati-
ng contacts and dialogues with the Ncrth Korea, the Soviet
Union, and China.
The South Korean government vehemently opposed
American troop withdrawal plans. It argued that a serious
military imbalance between North and South existed and that
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a premature withdrawal of U.S. troops would tempt North Korea
to try a military venture against the South. It warned further
that the two Koreas would become involved in an expensive and
dangerous arms race that might lead to the development of
nuclear capabilities. Withdrawal also would increase Japanese
doubts about the credibility of U.S. security commitments to
Asia, and Japan would then pursue either rapid rearmament or
accommodation with the Soviet Union. The Koreans also argued
that the Soviet Union's active military buildup in the far
east increased South Korea's strategic value to the United
States, not only for the defense of Japan, but also for U.S.
security.
To make a forceful and effective representation of its
views concerning the U.S. security role in Asia, the South
Korea tried to reach the U.S. public and Congress directly.
The result was a stepped-up effort to foster opinions and
attitudes more favorable to the Republic of Korea. But a
byproduct of the subsequent efforts was the so-called
Koreagate scandal. It created far more problems for Korean-
U.S. relations. The lobbying scandal, which dominated news
headlines in both the United States and South Korea for nearly
two years (1977-1979), significantly undermined the South
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Korean government's ability to conduct effective diplomacy.
During that period, two parallel investigations, one by the
U.S. Justice Department and other by the House Committee on
standards and official Conduct (the Ethics Committee) were
conducted in connection with allegations that, during the
first half of the 1970s, South Korean agents had spent several
million dollars to buy influence among U.S. congressman and
other officials [Ref. 50: p.214 ]
On the other hand, South Korea was irritated by the
ways in which the investigation of the alleged South Korean
lobbying activities in the U.S. was handled by the U.S.
government and press. As the U.S. was displeased by apparent
Korean audacity in attempting to influence the decision-making
process in the United States, so was South Korea disappointed
by the insensitivity of the United States in allowing its
Junior alliance partner to be accused of wrong-doing by the
mass media, legislature, and its own Justice Department. A
similar sentiment seemed to prevail within the South Korea
over the ways in which the human-rights issue was being
handled by the United States.
When the Washington post and NewYork Times reported
that the U.S. had first learned of the influence lobbying
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through electronic eavesdropping of President Park's Blue
House, the Korean government and people were in great anger.
On 22 June, 1978 U.S. Congress finally got tough with
Seoul in a tangible manner. To show its displeasure over
Seoul's refusal to provide Kim Dong Jo for testimony, $56
million in food aid was cut off. This action resulted in Kim
resigning as President Park's International Affairs Advisor,
but it also extinguished the last flicker of hope that he or
the South Korean government would cooperate any further with
the investigation.[Ref. 51: p.233 ]
The so called "Korea gate" scandal ended essentially
in August 1979 when the U.S. Justice Department dropped all
charge of lobbying against Park Tong Sun. In fact, it was
precisely during this period that President Jimmy Carter's
troop withdrawal plans became the object of persistent attack
from influential members of the Congress and military leaders.
President Carter's plan to withdraw all 33,000 U.S. ground
troops from Korea within a four-to-five year period was
announced at a press conference held on 9 March 1977, less
than two months after his inauguration.
On the other hand, President Nixon's visit to China in
the spring of 1972 was responsible for the opening of the
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North-South Korean dialogue in July of that year. South Korean
participation in the talks was aimed at exploring the
possibility of ending the extreme hostility that had prevailed
in the peninsula for twenty-five years. But deadlock was
inevitable because each side feared that the other's proposal
would weaken its own ideological, military, and international
positions.
Another significant development with regard to Korean-
U.S. relations in the 1960s and 1970s was the diversification
of Korea's foreign economic relations. The U.S. share in
Korea's total trade dropped from 49 percent in 1962 to 27
percent in 1976. By 1967, Japan had surpassed the United
States as South Korea's primary trading partner, a position
which Japan has maintained ever since. The combined share of
the United States and Japan in Korea's total trade also has
been decreasing, from a high of 76 percent in 1962 to 67
percent in 1976. As of 1976, the United States was still the
largest creditor country, with 35 percent of South Korea's
total loans, but most of the loans in recent years have been
coming from sources other than those in either the United
States or Japan. [Ref. 52: p.217]
The Korean-U.S. relationship in the second half of the
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1970s exhibited strains and agonies of transition from what
might be called a primarily patron-client relationship to some
kind of a partnership, even though the asymmetry between the
partners in perceptions, power, and influence remained. It is
not surprising that an alliance that had been born and
functioned on the basis of extreme inequality between the
partners would experience a serious strain when modifications
in that unequal relationship became necessary.
The United States, while remaining to disengage its
ground troops from Asia and to minimize the possibility of
getting involved in another Asian land war, still wished to
maintain its managerial powers concerning not only the
military situation in the area but also the internal
arrangements of its alliance partner. On the other hand, South
Korea showed continued heavy reliance on the United States
not only for its national defense but also in diplomatic and
political support, while at the same time resenting lingering
U.S., paternalism and interference. Furthermore, in its
dealing with the United States, South Korea showed a remark-
able inability to understand the intricate workings of the
American political and policymaking process, often because it
projected its own internal dynamics on the U.S. scene.
65
Henry Kissenger's reflections on the "troubled
partnership" of the Atlantic Alliance in the mid-1960s seem
quite appropriate to the Korean-U.S. relationship:
[Ref. 53: p.218 ]
Throughout much of the postwar period, the policy of
our...Allies has consisted essentially in influencing
American decision rather than developing conceptions of
their own. This, in turn, produced querulousness and in-
security. At times, our Allies have seemed more eager to
extract American reassurance than to encourage a
consistent United States policy. Excessive suspicion has
been coupled with formal pliancy... This has led to a
negativism charac terizea by a greater awareness of risks
than of opportunities and a general fear of any departure
from the status quo.
The 1970s were a period not only of transition in U.S.
-ROK relations but also of learning for South Korea. Gradual-
ly, more emphasis was given to persuading the United States
with reasoned arguments transmitted through official channels
than with emotional pleas or unorthodox methods, as before.
2. The withdrawal proposal
The 1976 United States Presidential campaign must have
caused deep apprehension in Seoul. By the time Carter had
taken office in January, 1977 all the major factors in the
Korean peninsula were watching with great interest, and some
with concern, as to how American policy would be changed.
The first major change in policy was the withdrawal
announcement. Basically, President Carter had justified his
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withdrawal decision on two premises. First, he felt Korea
would be sufficiently developed economically to defend itself,
and Secondly, he considered the political climate in Northeast
Asia stable enough to facilitate the pullout.
Although the withdrawal decision did not come as a
complete surprise, the ROK government was disconcerted by the
poor timing of the announcement. Also, there was a concern
that the U.S. troop-withdrawal decision would be constructed
as an American rebuke of the ROK government. South Korea was
also displeased because the United States had not sought
assurance from the communists side to stabilize the Korean
situation before taking unilateral action on troop withdrawal.
In April 1978, in a direct challenge to President
Carter, the House Armed Service Committee vcted overwhelmingly
to prevent a premature withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from
Korea. In response to strong congressional pressure, President
Carter decided to postpone the withdrawal decision
indefinitely after an initial pullout in 1978 of some 3,500
troops.
By spring of 1978 President Carter was slowing down
the withdrawal phasing. His excuse was that Congress had to
approve his $800 million in equipment and $250 million in FMS
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credits promised to South Korea. The stiff opposition from
Congressional critics in the U.S. as well as from South Korea
and Japan, was also beginning to take its toll.
(Ref. 54: p.219 ]
President Carter during a state visit to Korea in
1979, noted the existence of strong bonds of friendship and
cooperation and assured President Park that the U.S. would
continue to support the efforts of ROK government to maintain
peace and stability and sustain economic and social
development. The two Presidents also noted the importance of
all nations of respect for internationally recognized human
rights. President Carter expressed the hope that the process
of political growth in the ROK would continue commensurate
with economic and social growth of the Korean nation.
(Ref. 55: p.109 ]
In February, 1979 the President announced a temporary
suspension of the plan, followed by a formal announcement in
July that he would maintain the current strength level until
at least 1981. The official reason given was increased North
Korean personnel and tank strength provided showed in an
updated intelligence estimate. The reaction by both South
Korea and Japan to the withdrawal suspension was positive.
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3. HUMAN RIGHTS
Though the Koreagate issue had terminated, Mr.
Carter's interjection of "human rights" considerations into
U.S. foreign policy has continued.
Mr. Carter's emphasis on morality in foreign policy
was largely due to his perception that America needed to
restore confidence in .t s own democratic processes after
Vietnam and Watergate. However, the perception of Asian
nations, including South Korea, was that, instead of
rectifying Kissenger's "amorality," Mr. Carter had swung the
United States from one extreme, indifference, to another,
over-concern, resulting in unacceptable interference in their
internal affairs. (Ref. 56: p.235 ]
The policy of pursuing a consistent human rights
policy in South Korea met with a number of obstacles. First,
U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia were still firmly
tied to a viable and strong South Korean government.
Secondly, South Korea firmly opposed the United States linking
security assistance to human rights pressures, and Thirdly,
the South Korean government was becoming less willing to bow
to American influence when it came to matters they considered
internal.
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In 1979, Carter visited South Korea for the purpose of
alleviating the South Korean and Japanese concern over United
States commitments to South Korea, of applying new pressure on
Seoul for human rights reform. He did the latter by talking
with President Park on a live telecast broadcast to the entire
South Korea countryside. He cited that the economic progress
achieved by the South Koreans could be "matched by similar
progress through the realization of basic human aspirations in
political and human rights." The South Koreans were not happy
over the lecture nor did they comprehend Mr. Carter's logic
on human rights. One Seoul official put it: (Ref. 57: pp.240-
241 ]
Sometimes it seems the U.S. asks much more of its
friends than of countries that do not even try to measure
up to American ideas on things like human rights.
The Carter style of implementing stated policy has
disturbed and perplexed Asian allies especially South Korea
and Japan. The fact that President Carter announced the U.S.,
troop withdrawal plan without prior consultations with Japan
angered leaders in Tokyo, who are as much concerned with
stability on the Korean peninsula as are South Koreans.
Generally speaking, U.S.-South Korean relations passed
through three phases during the Carter administration. Its
first two years constituted the first phase, when the
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relationship between the two countries sank to its lowest
point. During this period, Carter announced his troop
withdrawal plan, the U.S. investigation of the Korean lobbying
scandal was conducted in full steam, and the U.S. government
assumed what South Korean officials described as a "hectoring"
attitude concerning the human-rights situation in Korea.
During the second phase, which began toward the end of
1978 and lasted until the assassination of President Park
Chung-hee in October 1979, the Koreagate investigations came
to an end, and President Carter reversed his troop-withdrawal
decision. Relations gradually improved as the Carter
Administration moved closer to the South Korean view about
North Korea's military threat as well as about the strategic
importance to the United States of the Korean peninsula.
The third phase of the Carter policy toward Korea
began with the death of President Park in October 1979. In the
post-Park period, the United States was primarily concerned
with South Korean security, lest North Korea be tempted to
take military advantage of the post-Park transition. Mindful
of the authoritarian nature of the Park regime, however, the
U.S. was also intent upon playing a key role in facilitating
a smooth transition to a more stable and competitive political
system.
The main source of strain between the two countries,
which persisted toward the end of the Carter administration
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was what the South Korean government considered to be
unwarranted interference in the name of human rights and
democracy in Korea's internal affairs. The Carter
administration did not seem to understand the limited nature
of U.S. leverage in the Korean domestic political process.
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IV. KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA
A. GENERAL PERCEPTION
What are the perceptions that Koreans have of America and
its people? The answer to these questions are necessarily
limited because it is impossible to know all the different
perceptions that individual Koreans hold.
Generally speaking, Koreans tend to view America in a very
favorable light. They like and admire America. They believe a
firm alliance with her is essential to Korea's national
security, brings economic benefits, and promises freedom and
democracy. Apart from this general trend, there are some
Koreans who detest what they regard as America's "big power"
arrogance; those who abhor Korea's "subjugation" to American
interests, and those who believe that "American democracy"
means nothing but confusion and disorder.
In spite of complexities in perceptions, I believe that
the way America is perceived in Korea may be summarized as
follows:
First, America is viewed as a wealthy nation, with
unrivaled leadership in science and technology and unsurpassed
living standards. This positive image has been reinforced by
the perception that American economic assistance to Korea over
the past has been instrumental in bringing about the recent
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growth of the Korean economy.
Second, America is viewed as a land of liberty, democracy,
and justice. This perception is particularly significant in
Korea because Koreans have looked on America as the most
glorious model of freedom and human rights.
Third, America is considered as a big and powerful
country. Such a perception is not unique to the Koreans, but,
since Koreans attach great significance to America's role as
a leading free-world power and her strong defense commitments
to Korea, they have a particularly favorable perception of
America in this regard.
Fourth, America is viewed as a land of opportunity where
individual efforts and abilities are richly rewarded. A great
aspiration of generations of Korean youth has been to go to
America and study. Today, a great many Koreans see a land of
promise, where they would like to emigrate.
Fifth, on the negative side, America is viewed as a nation
where pragmatism is so dominant that material and utilitarian
values are often prized above all else, in the name of
rationalism and realistic considerations. Many Koreans feel
that this pragmatic approach is inimical to their way of
thinking.
Sixth, America is viewed as a nation where morality is
breaking down fast, as evidenced by rampant teenage crime and
numerous divorces. Koreans, accustomed to a Confucian image of
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life, generally find such social trends in America repugnant.
Seventh, America is viewed as a nation whose policy toward
Korea has been inconsistent. A notable example is a series of
policy shifts regarding a plan to withdraw American troops
from Korea. Many Koreans hold this view despite their
appreciation of America's contributions to Korean security and
economic development. Many Koreans are also unhappy about what
they regard as America's failure to give primary consideration
to Korean interests over Japan and China.
The above list is by no means complete. But what is
indicated is that the Korean perceptions of America are very
favorable as a whole. What are the chief psychological bases
for such a favorable perception? Perhaps the most significant
factor is the big-power and small power relationship, in which
America plays the role of the protector. This relationship has
led Koreans to develop a basic attitudt of appreciation and
even dependence based on Confucian thought. Another fact is
that Korean have regarded America as the model for their own
nation building. America was considered the ideal state,
blessed with liberty, democracy, and social justice, as well
as a thriving free-enterprise economy. This situation may be
similar to that of communists looking to the USSR as their
nation building model.
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B. THE POSITIVE PERCEPTION
1. America as a Protector
To most Koreans, America has long been their favorite
country. This has been the case despite the fact that
Americans have often shown little or no interests in Korea,
have generally held an unfavorable view of Koreans, and have
even wished to keep Korea at arm's length.
The American image in Korea has been a generally
favorable one throughout the history of relations. Major
factors contributing to this favorable image seem to be that
Koreans expect America to play the role of Protector; that
America is a model for the kind of country Korea wishes to be,
complete with freedom, democracy, and social justice, and has
a free-enterprise system.
In the past, Koreans thought America was a country
that "helps the weak and protects justice." Such a perception
persists even today, according to Baek Nak Joon(The President
of Younsei University of Korea) "Of all the nations in the
world, if there ever was a nation that is not selfish, it must
be America. America is basically interested in helping and
cooperating with others. America wants to assist and leads
smaller nations, rather than exploit them." [Ref. 59:p.171]
Also, Premier Hur Jung in 1960, said in his interview with
Korean Daily: [Ref. 58:p.171]
In a word, we should give thanks to America. Modern
76
civilization is Christian civilization and that was
introduced by America... Where can we find such a country
in the world protecting our peace and pacific security?
Therefore, we should keep friendly relations with America
forever.
As mentioned above, Koreans have a tendency to
consider America as a very favorable way from the past. In
response to the question "Which nation is most friendly to
Korea?" in a survey, 83% picked America. In a more recent
survey(November 1981) 60.6% picked America as their favorite
nation, while 9.4% chose Switzerland, 7.7% Israel, 4.3% Great
Britain, and 2.7% France[Ref.59:p.136]
The result of these two surveys, taken 16 years apart,
show that a great majority of Koreans continue to favor
America, by a large margin, over other countries. One reason
that Koreans like America so much may be found in Korea's need
for help in preserving peace and security in Korea. Throughout
history, the Korean peninsula has been a battle ground for
power struggles among its stronger neighbors; Japan, Russia,
and China. Koreans regard America as someone who could help
protect Korea from the intrusion of its neighbors despite
Korea's geographical location.
Korea's current relationship with America is likened
by more than a few observers to the relationship that Korea
used to have with China for many centuries. This from Dong A-
Ilbo (Korean Daily newspaper): (Ref.60:p.137]
Like the Meyong Dynasty(ancient Chinese government)
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Heavenly Army which came to the rescue of the Korea's Yi
Dynasty, during Imjin Waeran(war with Japan in 1592),
America, by coming to the aid of Korea, has left a strong
impression on Koreans as a "savior." This sense of
gratitude toward America and the tendency to rely on
America have been so deeply ingrained in the minds of
Koreans that their spirit of self-reliance and
independence has been seriously disoriented and eroded.
It must be noted that a substantial number of Koreans
have shown tendencies to view the Korean-American relations
from the perspective of the Confucian order. This tendency has
been particularly pronounced among Korea's elite. It has led
some Koreans into a state of mind where they felt as though it
were Americans' responsibilities for insuring Korea's
security and democracy. But these tendency have now diminished
and weakened to a great degree.
The idea of enlisting the help of America goes back to
1882. Even before the Korean-American Treaty of 1882 was
signed, many of the Korean power elite contemplated ties with
the United States. The decision to establish treaty relations
with America was based on the belief that America's support
was essential if Korea was to retain her integrity. Some
Koreans viewed the Chemulpo's (or Shufeldt) Treaty as a wedge
to free Korea from Chinese domination, and when General Foote
arrived in Korea in May 1883 as the first American minister to
Korea, the Korean King "danced with joy," for he along with
others regarded the United States as the "symbol of a
beneficent power that would indisputably guarantee the
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integrity of the Korean nation." [Ref.61:p.12]
Anyway, in May 1882, Korea signed the Treaty of Amity
and Commerce with America, a power without territorial
ambitions, convinced that America was trustworthy and
friendly. Article I of the treaty read in part: "If other
powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government,
the other will exert their good offices to bring about an
amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings."
[Ref. 62: p.21] The Koreans mistook this for a solid
commitment. America signed the treaty because she was
interested in protecting and promoting her commercial
interests and in facilitating the work of the missionaries.
However, the Korean government at the time was very
accommodating and friendly to America in many areas. Believing
that the United States was a friendly and beneficent power
capable of protecting Korea's independence, the Korean King
took positive steps to promote close ties with the United
States; he promoted confidential relationships with American
ministers, he sought Amezican drill masters for his army, he
employed American teachers for the school for the children of
nobility, he employed Americans in important government
positions, he made social grants to American-sponsored
educational institutions, and he stood firm on his decision to
establish diplomatic offices in the United States despite the
strong opposition from China and Japan.
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When World War II broke out, America left its
isolationism behind, switched to a policy of international
interventionism, and emerged as a principal architect and
protector of a new world order. In contrast to the period
between 1910 and 1945, during which the U.S., paid scant
attention to the difficult situation of the Korean people
under Japanese colonial control, the U.S. became increasingly
involved in the affairs of the Koreans following the
termination of World War II.
After a brief period of uncertainties from 1948 to
1950, cordial relations developed between the U.S., and Korea.
America intervened in the Korean war and performed the role of
protector. She built, equipped, and helped maintain South
Korean Military forces, and stationed U.S. forces in the South
Korea to guard against a renewed attack from the North. The
United States and its allies fought the North Korean and
Chinese communists and preserved South Korea. Naturally, the
Korean government and people displayed their traditional pro-
American sentiments.
The American commitment to South Korea's national
security after 1953, and U.S. economic and other forms of aid
not only sustained the life of the nation, but also helped
South Korea to achieve what it calls "The Miracle of Han
River" during the past decades.
On August 7, 1953 the United States initiated a draft
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of the mutual security pact with South Korea and guaranteed
the security of South Korea. A final draft of the mutual
security pact was initiated in Washington on October 1 1953,
and when Secretary Dulles presented the treaty to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, he pointed out that the primary
purpose of the pact was to give the notice to the communists
"beyond any possibility of misinterpretation, that the United
States would not be indifferent to any new communist
aggression in Korea."[Ref. 63:p.20]
When the assassination of President Park plunged Korea
into political confusion in 1979, America quickly dispatched
the seventh Fleet to Korean waters as a deterrence against
North Korean moves. Although Korea has made great strides in
economic development and moved gradually into a relationship
of interdependence with America, Korea's military strength has
not shown a corresponding growth.
In a word, with the help of an American guarantee for
the security of South Korea, together with an enormous amount
of American economic and military aid, South Korea not only
achieved a remarkable economic development, but also brought
about an astonishing degree of cultural and social changes.
But the possibility of the national unification of Korea
remains as remote as ever, while tensions did not subside in
Korea, making the improvement of political in Korea quite
difficult.
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2. AS A MODEL FOR NATION BUILDING
When Korea was forced to open its doors to the rest of
the world, first, by the Japanese in 1876, then, even wider by
the United States in 1882, the aging and impotent government
of Korea found itself powerless in the game of imperialist
power politics and was totally unprepared to guide the shocked
nation into a new world of violently different order.
But upon opening the door to the Western World, Korea
was dashing headlong into an era of enlightenment and opened
her doors to modernization. And, of all Occidental nations,
America was the Koreans' chosen model of modern society.
Suddenly confronted with the vitality of Western
culture during the latter half of the 19th century, Koreans
blamed their own political and cultural tradition for all the
stagnancy, ineffectiveness, and injustice in their society.
"The whole nation was waiting for something fresh and powerful
from somewhere to come in to lift her spirit up from the state
of despair." Thus Koreans were highly receptive to the
political, social, and cultural ideas and institutions that
Americans brought with them after second World War II. The
dissemination of these ideas and institutions was all the more
rapid and fundamental, because they were part of the culture
of a welcome liberator and, later, a powerful ally in the
Koreans' struggle for survival in the Korean war. [Ref.
64:p.197]
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From the very early days, Korean interactions with
American culture have been most intense and pervasive. Despite
the high hopes that some political leaders, particularly King
Kojong, placed the American role as a friendly mediator in the
colonialistic power struggle for hegemony on the Korean
peninsula, political and commercial relations between Korea
and America during the closing decades of the 19th century
were insignificant.
Evidently, it is clear that it was rather the
activities of American Protestant missionaries that made
lasting impressions on Koreans and prepared the groundwork for
the massive influx of American culture into Korea after 1945.
Since the first American missionary arrived in Korea in
September 1884, many others followed him quickly and soon
began their work in varied fields. Their activities in all
fields were well received by the Koreans from the very
beginning and by the time the Japanese absorbed Korea into
their expanding empire in 1910, there were "altogether 807
churches, 200,000 converts, over 400 Korean pastors, 257
foreign missionaries, 350 schools directly attached to
Christian missions, 15,000 students receiving instruction from
Christian missionaries, and 15 hospitals under mission
management"[Ref. 65: p.196]. Starting in the summer of 1884,
the missionaries were admitted into the country, although the
ban on the propagation of Christianity was not yet officially
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lifted until 1888. It appears that the government of Korea
wanted specifically the "Americans" to do some of the urgent
works for modernization of the country, which included Western
medical and educational works.
In the minds of many Koreans, American Protestantism
was also a repository of social and political ideas for
reforms needed in the Korean society. Koreans at this time
were concerned with the problem of averting the fate of
colonization, and this aim in the long run could be achieved
by marking the nation strong through social reforms and modern
education. One of the ways in which the American Protestants
carried out their missionary work was through education. They
were the first to establish modern educational institutions in
Korea, and many Koreans attracted to them.
American missionaries, meanwhile, kept on teaching
revolutionary ideologies of democracy, as well as Christian
ideals. So Chae-pill, Syngman lee, and Yun Chi-Ho, who were
among the first Koreans to study in America, came home and
organized TongniD Hyobhoe (The independent club), the first
western-oriented political organization. The group sought to
promote ideas of freedom and equality and advocated equality
and a constitutional government. Almost all historians agree
with that Dr. So Che-pil was the first man who did the most
for the awakening of the political and social consciousness in
the Koreans.
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Upon his return from America, he decided to devote his
energies to the education of the masses which he felt Korea
needed most urgently. To do this, he chose to publish a
newspaper, THE INDEPENDENT. In an article "what Korea needs
most?" published with the help of the Methodist Missionary
H.G. Appenzella as one of its editors, Dr. So wrote:
[Ref. 66:p.200 ]
My purpose of this paper is not to discuss politics, but
to endeavor to bring before the public my ideas as to how
to bring about the solution of this grave
problem...Without education the people will never
understand the good intentions of the government and
without education the government officers will never
make good laws...There may be several methods of relief,
but education is one of the most effective and permanent
means.
Also, in the editorial of the October 7, 1897 issue of THE
INDEPENDENT he wrote:
At the time we first began publications, our basic
intention was to inform the Korean people about world
happenings... Moreover, we decided that the articles
should deal with both the right and the wrong things
people do so as to bring censure down on those who do
wrong and to recommend those who do right things.
As the above quotes indicate, THE INDEPENDENT was not only to
inform the masses of the things happening in the world, but to
make them think actively on the matters of political and
social concerns and urge them to come out of apathy. So Che-
pil wrote most of its 776 editorials himself. Through these
editorials, he taught that "all men were created equal by God,
and the existing inequality in Korea was, therefore, against
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the will of God, the individual human rights enjoyed by the
Westerners were the rewards they earned through struggle, and
Koreans, too, must struggle to earn the same right."
[Ref. 67:p.413 ] This thought was implanted in the minds of
Koreans. Thus American ideologies, which were introduced by
Seo, gradually gained support in the Korean society. Affected
by these thoughts, many missionary schools were founded as a
base of nation building. In short, the ultimate goals of
mission school education were not merely to teach Western
curriculum, but, more importantly, to restore in the Koreans
the sense of pride and accomplishment by earning their own
education through manual work, and to train them to be
Christian workers for their own people.
When Dong-A Ilbo (Korean Dailynews) was founded in
1920, it declared "Democracy is our objective" as editorial
principles. When a group of American lawmakers visited Korea
in the same year, the newspaper said in an editorial welcoming
the visitors: [Ref.68: p.144)
America is a refuge for the persecuted and a safe harbor
for the oppressed. Countless are those who were accepted
by your benign land away from attacks on their conscience.
Countless are those who, fleeing from a thousand shocks of
persecution, found liberty among your masses. Behold. The
eyes of all the oppressed peoples of the world are lifted
toward America. Their minds open toward America with
longings... Deprived, eC ressed and powerless though we
are, our objective is c dar. We will abide by the truth,
strive according to democracy, and achieved liberation and
freedom; We shall build a nation of wealth, decency and
strength, which will please God. This is our desire, our
faith and our ideal.
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After being liberated from Japan at the end of world
war II, Korea tried to follow the model of America in many
respects based on the principle of freedom, democracy, and
social justice. In 1948, a constitutional government was
established for the first time in history with American-
sponsored free elections. Independence and democracy were
realized at long last. But the soil was arid, the environment
was too harsh, for this tree of democracy to grow. Trial and
error repeated. Democratic development lagged far behind the
military, economic, and social progress. So sometimes Koreans
were suspicious about American democracy. In spite of this
reality, the great majority of Koreans still favor American
ideologies and social systems, and this propensity is chiefly





If the Sino-Japanese war was the first test for
American-Korean relations, the Russo-Japanese war brought a
second severe test. The Japanese domination of Korea was so
much advanced by 1903 that Korea was not even an issue during
the Russo-Japanese pre-war negotiations of 1903-1904, and the
Japanese victory in the war sealed the fate of Korea. During
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the war, the United States judicially carried out the
traditional policy of neutrality. Secretary Hay instructed
Allen soon after the war broke out: "Presume you will do all
possible for the protection of American interests consistent
with absolute neutrality." The desperate Korean government
turned to Allen for help, but he only carried out the policy
of neutrality throughout the entire period of the war.
(Ref. 69: p.28]
At that time, Korea received little political
assistance from the United States. The U.S. maintained its
strict neutrality in the Sino-Japanese war, and when the
Korean emperor asked the American Minister Allen to solicit
his government's aid to establish Korea's political neutrality
to protect her independence, President McKinly refused to act.
Koreans were disappointed. America had not only failed to meet
their expectation of help, but had even refused to extend her
"good offices" as stipulated in Article I of the 1882 treaty.
The main controversy regarding Roosevelt's Korean
policy centers around the issue of offering good offices for
the Koreans as specified in the first article of the 1882
treaty and the Taft-Katsura Memorandum of 1905. The entire
good office clause reads: "If other powers deal unjustly or
oppressively with either government, the other will exert
their good offices, and being informed of the case, to bring
about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly
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feelings." Philip L. Bridgham among others, was very clear
about the United States policy toward Korea under the
leadership of Roosevelt. He said "The United States was guilty
of violating both in spirit and substance a treaty."
(Ref.70: p.28 ) At that time, the main difficulty the Koreans
had was informing the Americans. The Koreans made at least
four serious efforts to reach the President in the winter of
1905, but all of them failed because Roosevelt took a
formalistic view and told them to come through an official
diplomatic channel which was already under the Japanese
control.
On his way to the Philippines in the summer of
1905, Taft visited Tokyo and had a conversation with the
Japanese Prime Minister Katsura on the subjects of Korea and
the Philippines. The memorandum of the conversation became
later a source of scholarly controversy. Whether it was an
"honest exchange of view," a "deal," or an understanding, the
Japanese thought the American government gave them a sanction
for taking over Korea, even before the conclusion of the
Portsmouth Peace Conference.
Once Korea was forced to sign the protectorate
treaty with Japan in 1905, the American legation in Seoul was
the first foreign mission to pull out. The United States
closed down its legation in Seoul without giving an
"expression of sympathy" to the Korean or "waiting till the
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funeral was over." After that, other foreign missions left
Seoul "like the stampede of rats from a sinking ship." [Ref.
71: p.48 ] The Koreans felt betrayed. Evidently, Korea at the
time did not know America, nor did she know that there was no
such words as "compassion" and "pity" in the lexicon of
international relations.
The United States, by means of the Taft-Katsura
agreement, had obtained from Japan assurances that she would
not turn her aggression in the direction of the Philippine
Islands, and in doing so, had subordinated Korea's national
interests to her own. But to the Koreans, this became known as
the "first" great disappointment. But the United States might
not have anticipated the Japanese annexation of Korea when the
Taft-Katsura Memorandum of July 1905 was exchanged between the
U.S., and Japan. However, the policy adopted and actions taken
during the Roosevelt administration contributed to the demise
of the Korean nations in 1910.
(b) The Second Disappointment
Japan continued in her objective of total
dominance over Korea and on August 22, 1910, Japan annexed
Korea and made it a part of the Japanese empire. Korean
nationalism was mainly of a pacifist nature under the
Japanese, but there were demonstrations which were put down
with great brutality by the Japanese. The most important of
these occurred on 1 March 1919 and is still recognized in
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Korea as a national holiday. This particular demonstration was
encouraged by President Wilson's address to the Congress on
January 9, 1918, where he enunciated his famous "Fourteen
Points". To the Korean nationalists the call for self-
determination and "principle of justice to all people and
nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of
liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or
weak" was the needed encouragement to speak out against the
Japanese, and this they did in a Korean Declaration of
Independence. This was read to the Korean public by the
thirty-three patriots who signed the declaration. Immediately
afterward, these men offered themselves up for arrest and this
was the beginning of the Independence Movement, which would be
suppressed over the course of the next few months with great
brutality.
During this time many Korean nationalists who were
living in the United States petitioned President Wilson to
intervene in the Korean affair. They quoted Article I of the
1882 treaty and the principle of the League of Nations.
President Wilson was said to be in great anguish over the
plight of the Korean people, but could not help them because
of the international agreements that had been concluded in
good faith with Japan. This is considered by modern day
Koreans as the second great disappointment.
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(c) Third Despair
At the end of World War II, American troops landed
in Korea as "liberators," beginning a new history of
America's role as a direct participant in Korean affairs.
America had also taken the initiative in dividing the Korean
peninsula in two, along a line drawn for military convenience.
Later, super powers proposed a five-year trusteeship
arrangement for Korea. These developments were merely
additional series of expectations and frustrations in Korea's
relations with America.
In 1948, America helped establish a new government
in South Korea, but soon afterwards, pulled her troops out of
Korea without bothering to prepare and equip the country
adequately for its self defense. This was in sharp contrast to
what Soviet Russia did for North Korea, which became an
adequately supplied and equipped forwards base for communism.
Despite strong objections of the South Korean government, the
United States withdrew its troops from Korea by the end of
June 1949, leaving behind poorly indoctrinated, trained, and
supplied soldiers of the newly created Korean army and a small
United States Military Advisory Group. Furthermore, a high
American official made a public announcement to the effect
that Korea was outside the defense perimeters of America.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson told a Congressional Committee
that the American line of defense in the Far East extends from
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Alaska through the Aleutian chain, Japan, and Okinawa to the
Philippines and made no mention of Korea. In his remarks of
January 12, 1950 in a speech before the National Press Club,
he reiterated that the United States defense perimeter runs
along the Aleutian islands to Japan, and from Japan to the
Philippines, and again he made no reference to Korea.
South Korea, which seemed to have been abandoned
by the United States, was invaded by the North Korean
communist troops on June 25, 1950. As many had feared, the
Korean War finally came. "The Korean war began in a way in
which wars often begin," said Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles in 1953," a potential aggressor miscalculated."
(Ref. 72: p.20 ] At least to the Koreans point of view, a
tragedy was invited to some degree by America's
shortsightedness.
The devastating war in Korea was brought to an end
with the signing of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953. But
contrary to the spirit and letters of the joint statement of
August 7, 1953, the United States failed to consult further
regarding the attainment of a unified, free and independent
Korea. Be that as it may, the uneasy truce in Korea was
maintained for a quarter of a century, although unending
boarder clashes and bloody events have occurred across the
150-mile truce line.
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2. BIG POWER ARROGANCE
Ordinary Koreans have few opportunities for direct
contact with Americans. Most Americans in Korea are
missionaries, businessmen, teachers, and soldier. Therefore
the image of America in the minds of the ordinary Koreans is
often formed on the basis of the behavior of American
servicemen stationed in Korea. Especially during the Korean
war, there were eight American divisions in Korea. The G.I.
life style provided occasional shocks to Koreans. Incidents
and situations that Koreans found particularly unpalatable and
offensive included: daughters of upright families raped by
soldiers; prostitution doing a thriving business near military
bases; Amerasian children being left behind by American
soldier fathers. Whenever an American military base is set up,
traditional Korean mores and living styles tended to be
disturbed.
When American forces occupied South Korea at the end
of World U.r II, there was a maxim that made the rounds among
Koreans: "Never trust the Americans; don't be fooled by the
Soviets; the Japan will rise up again." [Ref. 73: p.42] It
was not surprising that the Koreans were warned about the
Soviets or Japanese. But why should America or the Americans
have been downgraded at that juncture? It is likely that the
maxim reflects the pains of disappointment which Koreans felt
in their relations with America between 1882 and 1945. When
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Koreans expected full independence as soon as the Japanese
domination ended, the American military sought to enlist the
cooperation of Japanese officials in governing Korea.
Even though, the American forces rescued Korea from
the aggression of North Korea in the Korean War and supported
in many respects, the Korean attitude toward America has been
tinged with a touch of mistrust. Occasionally, Korean
sentiment flares up in anger against America, and becomes
anti-American. the Koreans are susceptible to the pain of
indignity when they see their interests slighted by the
Americans on account of considerations that have to be made in
favor of Japan and China; it is considered conceivable that
the real motivation for the American intervention in Korea was
the defense of Japan. Some have even argued that America
signed the Korean-American Mutual Defense Treaty also for the
benefit of Japanese security. At that time, one newspaper
editorial stated: "Once again we Koreans are afraid that
history will repeat itself and let America attempt to turn
Korea over Japan, Can Koreans afford to continue to put faith
in America?" [Ref.74: p.147]
When violent protests were staged in Korea against
Korean-Japanese negotiations for normalization of relations in
the mid-1960s, the protests were, at least partially, aimed at
America as well. The indignation was directed toward the
American policy of pushing for the normalization of Korea-
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Japan relations and of exerting influence in Japan's favor
during the negotiations.
In the early 1970s, America and China who were
adversaries in the Vietnam war decided to pull out of Vietnam.
America proclaimed the Nixon Doctrine and proceeded first to
withdraw one division from South Korea, even before
withdrawing forces from Vietnam. In making the decision on the
troop withdrawal from Korea, America did not even consult with
Korea.
In January 1977, Carter sent Vice-President Mondale on
an urgent mission to key allies for consultations. While in
Japan, Mondale briefed Japanese leaders on the American policy
on the troop withdrawal from Korea. But he did not visit
Korea, only two hours away from Japan. This incident
stimulated and amplified Korean's negative perceptions on
America.
3. ANTI-AMERICANISM
Anti-Americanism is on the rise in South Korea today.
The rise of anti-U.S. sentiment has been confirmed by some
Americans who have expressed deep concern that it is likely to
intensify, and an increasing number are reportedly taking the
matter seriously. Furthermore, there are reports that the
"honeymoon relationship" between the ROK and the U.S. is
drawing to a close.[Ref. 75: p.750] But it should be pointed
out that Korean anti-Americanism reveals a vast gap between
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the views and values of an older Korean generation that
witnessed the Communist revolution in the North and the Korean
war and those of the post-war generation with no direct
memories of the war itself. In Korea today, those aged 20 to
40 account for 58 percent, or about 14 million people, of all
eligible voters. This new generation, in search of Korea's
own national identity, is assertive, nationalistic, and is
critical of what it sees as South Korea's subservient position
to the United States and Japan.
But historically, anti-Americanism can be seen as a
resurgence of the dormant Korean nationalism of the left which
was crushed by the American occupation authorities and the
rightist government of Syngman Lee in the late 1940s and
1950s. The renaissance of leftist ideology coincides with a
search for a scapegoat for the country's problem. The United
States is an ideal scapegoat-htigemonic, rightist, intrusive,
ubiquitous, distant, and alien. Moreover, since Koreans have
been socialized to believe that America's mission is to
safeguard democracy and freedom in the world, many feel
betrayed by certain actions and inactions of the United States
in Korea. Today, while the bulk of the Korean population still
retains a favorable image of the United States, critical and
even hostile views are increasing.
In theory, Koreans should be grateful to the United
States for many things. The U.S. rescued South Korea in the
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Korean War and gave vast amounts of aid for economic
reconstruction. Korea's economic miracle became a model for
the Third World. The United States keeps its 40,000 troops to
deter North Korean aggression in spite of great deficit.
Thanks to ROK's security preparedness with American help,
Seoul has been able to sponsor numerous international events,
including the Asian Games in the fall of 1986 and the Seoul
Olympic Games in 1988. Moreover, compared to a North Korea,
South Korea enjoys an image of freedom and dynamism. Visiting
U.S. dignitaries always speak well of Korea's outstanding
performance in the security and economic fields. Today, South
Korea is the twelfth most active trading country in the world
and America's seventh greatest trading partner. Ever
increasing number of Korean immigrants continue to settle in
the United States, and thousand of Korean students study in
the U.S. American-educated Koreans occupy important and
sensitive positions in the ROK government. Evidently, there is
no anti-Americanism at the official level, and on one level
there is little basis for anti-Americanism in South Korea.
Perhaps this is why Gaston Sigar, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, expressed puzzlement over
anti-Americanism in South Korea during his visit to Seoul in
November 1986.[Ref. 76: p.9]
However, there is another Korean face, dark and
sinister. Victims of political repression, torture, and
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inhuman labor practices have their own reasons for feeling
bitter about their government's close ties with the United
States. Conversation with politicians, students, and
intellectuals in Korea make it clear that the Korean anti-
American sentiment is not simply shared by what the government
calls an extremely small group of so-called "impure elements"
in Korean society. They see the resentment against the United
States as an expression of broad-based malaise, of the feeling
that something has gone terribly wrong in Korea since the end
of World War II. The division of the Korean peninsula by the
great powers, the Korean War, the military coups of 1961 and
1979-1980, the Kwangju democratization movement in 1980, the
lack of progress toward reunification, the pervasive American
economic and cultural influences, the absence of full
political freedom and a growing gap between the rich and the
poor--every one of these issues has something to do with the
United States either directly or indirectly. And these issues
have become the focal points of debate among attentive people
in recent years. [Ref. 77: p.10]
There seems to be two different types of such anti-
American sentiments. First, there is resentment against
intervention and interference coming from the protector. The
second type of ant-American feelings stem from the view that
America is linked to authoritarian rulers, whose politics run
counter to American democratic beliefs, and are unwilling to
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provide even moral support for advocates of democracy.
Whenever Korea faced serious crises, America took appropriate
measures. Every step America takes regarding Korea-- military,
diplomatic, or economic-- has a dual meaning at least to some
Korean's point of view. On one hand, it is a friendly,
supportive act, but on the other hand, it may - considered as
an act of interference or intervention. The position of Korea
is that America's role should be confined to that of a
protector based on the mutual-defense treaty, and America
should refrain from interfering in Korea's domestic affairs.
This clash of views on what America's role should be has
created intense tension in the relations whenever Korea faced
political crises such as those in 1952, 1960, and 1961. Such
tension mounted to an unprecedented height in the May 1980
political crisis. This prompted one observer to comment that
the "special relationship" born in the foxholes during the
Korean War had been turned into a marriage of
inconvenienc3."[Ref. 78: p.149)
Also, there are some Koreans who believe and expect
that America should take a more active role in support of
democracy on Korea. Father John Daley, who has worked at
Seogang University in Seoul for 20 years, made this comment on
the subject: [Ref. 79: p.149]
Students have an idealistic view of the United States in
the sense that they have studied democracy and they feel
that the U.S. is powerful, so that the U.S. can do
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anything it wishes. They are constantly disappointed when
Korean government leaders can not offer the same democracy
to Korea and instead curtail the freedom of expression.
The U.S., they say, is doing nothing.
According to Farther Daley, some students have been so
disillusioned by America that they no longer consider America
as a model for an ideal state and they are developing a model
of their own, based on what they have learned from Socialist
literature.
Anti-Americanism has grown among Koreans basically
because of the long association of the two countries and the
heavy and influential American presence in South Korea. In his
departure interview at an airport news conference, outgoing
U.S. Ambassador James R. Lilley emphasized that "the fact that
only anti-Americanism, not anti-British or anti-French, exists
in South Korea is due to the strong American influence in the
country." And one editorial director of the Journal of
Commerce pointed out in a speech that "many Koreans resent
American influence, ideas and American troops. I am not
surprised that such feelings would arise; given the large
number of U.S., soldiers in South Korea, it is inevitable that
the United States will be blamed for many things."
(Ref. 80:p.750]
Viewed from the above position, anti-Americanism is a
very natural sentiment, usually witnessed in countries under
the strong influence of foreign powers.
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V. RECENT CAUSES OF NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS
A. CHANGING PERCEPTION
The image of the United States as the special nation began
in 1945 when Koreans perceived Americans as liberators who
eliminated the hated Japanese imperialist oppression, and when
America helped fight in the Korean war, Koreans considered it
a savior, and whenever the U.S. gave a hand to Korea in a
crisis, Koreans naturally were in the habit of regarding
America as a protector. Probably this kind of perception
originated in the traditional Asian view of international
relations. The so-called sadae relationship between Korea and
China was governed by an extrapolation from the Confucian
family system in which the younger brother served the older
brother and the older recognized a duty to the younger. This
kind of relationship and perception was taken for granted in
the Koreans' perception system which was deeply affected by
the Confucian order throughout history. Because the United
States replaced China as the older brother in the traditional
relationship, it was natural for Koreans to regard it as a
special state, and holding such a unique image of the country
has encouraged them to have various expectations of it.
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For the past three decades or so, Korea has been one of
the most pro-American nations in the world, but younger
generations today have no memory of the 1945 liberation, the
Korean war or the miserable poverty of the ROK in the 1950s
and early 1960s. Similarly, these same younger citizens are
less cognizant of the many positive steps the U.S. took to
assist Korea in overcoming its difficulties and securing the
phenomenal progress made during the post-world war II era.
Thus younger Koreans are naturally less ardently pro-American
than their elders. But this should be viewed as an inevitable
historical pendulum swing rather than an alarming
deterioration of Korean goodwill toward Americans.
While the older generation assumes a relatively friendly
attitude toward the United States, the "postwar generation" of
younger Koreans is critical of the superpower and the
situation in South Korea has taken on a new aspect with its
coming of age in the 1980s. These Koreans are influential
because of their numerical superiority and particularly
because of their higher education.
Today, some 62% of eligible voters in South Korea fall
between the ages of 20 and 39. The younger generation is
increasingly well educated and mobile. University students
constitute 3% of the population, compared with 2.0% in the
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U.S., and 1.47% in west Germany. Students' views are treated
with unusual respect in South Korea because of the traditional
Confucian reverence for education. A recent opinion survey of
1497 people rated students as the most influential group in
South Korean politics. Compiled with an institute of Seoul
National University poll from November 28 to December 31,
1988, the poll found 23.6% of those surveyed said that
students are the most influential group, followed by 22.8%
rating the military as most influential.[Ref.81: p.752]
Young Koreans witnessed neither the American role in
eliminating Japanese colonial rule in their country nor the
American sacrifice in the Korean war. Accordingly, they feel
that South Korea has no special bond with the U.S. and they
bitterly criticize the older generation for being
subserviently dependent on America. The younger people look at
the U.S. realistically and objectively; unstinting praise and
unconditional gratitude are regarded as habits of the past.
However, increasing anti-American sentiment cannot be
attributed solely to generational transition. Economic
prosperity and the social development it have spurred has
given rise to an increasingly sophisticated and educated
citizenry, which today displays a multiplicity of opinions.
This evolution has been hastened by the political
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liberalization of the last several years. It should be
recognized that the sharply escalating specter of outspoken
anti-Americanism among some political and social groups is, in
fact, a testament to the speed and success of democratization
in Korea. Just as Americans are not uniformly pro-Israeli,
pro-French or pro-Korean, for example, it is understandable
that Koreans do not display unanimity in their feelings toward
the U.S.
The perception of North Korea as a menace also differs
between the generations. Young Koreans do not attach great
importance to the South Korean-U.S. mutual security
relationship. Indeed, their overriding concern is
reunification of the two Koreas, and radical students consider
the presence of American troops in South Korea as the main
obstacle to national reunification. According to an opinion
poll of 551 university students through Korea conducted in
October 1988 by a research institute of Seoul National
University, 50.6% regarded the United States as "neither a
friend nor an enemy, but just a foreign country pursuing its
own interests," and 41.2% believed that America "was primarily
responsible for the division of Korea in 1945 and is the
greatest impediment to Korea's reunification." None of them
thinks the superpower "an ally to safeguard liberal democracy
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in Korea." As far as American forces are concerned, 60.4% of
those polled want the troops to be withdrawn--48.1 because the
American troops "make the division of Korea permanent" and
12.3% "because there is little possibility of another war in
Korea." Also, 84.5% of the respondents believe that American
influence "is as strong as ever" in South Korea, and therefore
the current government "is still subordinate to the United
States." The professor who conducted this survey remarked that
the Korean students' view of America "is never favorable to
the nation, but it is hard to think it anti-American. Rather,
we regard it as an expression of their efforts to take an
objective and neutral attitude toward the United States."
Young Koreans believe, in short, that a new, fair relationship
should be established between the two countries. The rise of
anti-American sentiment among the young generation has
provided momentum for the Korean people as a whole to review
the relationship between the two countries. According to a
survey of 1,403 middle-class Koreans conducted by Hangk Ilbo,
1987, 90% of the respondents agreed that "the United States is
more concerned with its own national interests than with
Korea's political development," and 66% of them did not think
it desirable that "America makes comments on Korea's
democratization."[Ref.82: p.753]
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These responses indicate that most Koreans have
abandoned the romantic view of America that had long been
cherished from their ancestors. The long standing presence of
American power and influence in South Korea has inspired among
young Koreans a critical view of the U.S., which has spread
widely among the people as a whole. In these situations, anti-
Americanism is the inevitable consequence of a changing
relationship between the two nations.
The long U.S. presence did not by itself lead to the rise
of an active anti-American movement in South Korea. Violent
demonstrations and, in particular, attacks on American
installations have been triggered by the enhancement of
national pride among Korean people and especially their
discontent with the U.S. role in the course of the struggle
for democracy in the country. Today, Koreans share a new
stirring of nationalism arising from their country's rapid
economic growth and political liberalization. This nationalism
was encouraged all the more by the success of the Seoul
Olympics. Ambassador Lilley spoke of the "new Korea " in these
terms:[Ref.83: p.754]
Today Korea is becoming increasingly well known for its
dramatic political transition, which has also occurred
with breath taking speed... The political transition
affects not only the National Assembly, but every corner
of Korean society, as people search for ways to translate
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the concept of democracy into realitj in school,
workplace, and every kind of organization... The Seoul
Olympic Games, recognized around world as a truly
magnificent achievement, symbolized Korea's new place in
the world community. Even before the games, Koreans were
looking at their place in the world community and making
adjustments in their foreign relationship with the United
States.
This new nationalism has given rise to a manifestation of the
"hidden" antiforeign feeling of the Korean people, and the
main target is Korea's "big brother," the United States.
Lilley pointed out "Korea's political transition is giving the
public a greater political voice than ever before, and the
public is using that freedom to question its relationship with
the United States.[Ref.84: p.755]
Some Koreans believe that arrogance, a sense of racial
superiority, and a bitter contempt for them have been
characteristic of Americans' behavior in the past, and they
seek to redress these past wrong and discriminatory relations
between the two peoples. Viewed in this way, anti-Americanism
seems more an effort to remedy a traditional Korean sentiment,
han, a smoldering bitterness about past wrongs.
Increasingly, Koreans are scrutinizing issues and events
that heretofore were considered taboo, leading to new and
radical theories about U.S. intentions toward the Korean
peninsula. However, the revisionist views circulating in horea
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that accuse the U.S. of maliciously dividing the peninsula,
opposing reunification, perpetuating authoritarianism, prating
economic imperialism and other similar misdeeds are
fundamentally incorrect. That the U.S. made policy mistakes in
the past is undeniable, but these complex issues do not lend
themselves to simplistic black-or-white, right-or-wrong
interpretations. In historical analysis as well as current
events, the subtle gray areas must also be examined.
With growing frequency, these gray areas are being
considered by the Korean people. There is no particular reason
to fear, however, that a significant number of Koreans will be
fooled by the hyperbolic claims of political extremists. The
basic reality remains that close political, economic and
security cooperation between the U.S. and the ROK clearly has
benefited both nations and should be sustained, although the
need for careful and constant fine-tuning of the relationship
occasionally will the tax the patience and understanding of
both sides.[Ref.85: p.20]
Some Koreans are asserting that Korea is no longer an
American dependent state, but Americans are unwilling to
accept the change and continues to stress only that the U.S.
has been the "protector" and "big brother" of Korea. Such an
American attitude is sufficient to prompt a public outcry from
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Koreans, now full of national pride. Therefore anti-
Americanism is the inevitable consequence of a changing
relationship between the two nations.
B. SEOUL OLYMPIC
The world witnessed a strange phenomenon in the course
of the 1988 Seoul Olympics when Koreans jeered the American
teams and cheered the Soviets in games between two
superpowers. This means that anti-Americanism has pervaded the
Korean people to a considerable extent. The occurrence was
mainly triggered by NBC'S unfair and distorted coverage of the
Olympics and South Korea, a theft by American swimmers, the
disorderliness of the American Olympic team during the opening
ceremony, and the damaging of the Olympic flag in the streets
of Seoul by American servicemen. Anti-American sentiment has
existed in South Korea since 1980, but the 1988 behavior of
Koreans proves that it has spread widely and at dramatic
speed. Many Koreans are still friendly to Americans in person
but they do not hesitate to criticize the United States, and
it is obvious that the pro-Americanism of the past has faded.
[Ref.86: p. 749]
Americans landed in Korea more than 40 years ago, and the
passage of four decades is long enough for Koreans to raise
and seek answers to the basic question, "What really has the
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United States been to us?" Many Koreans have now come to look
at the United States coolly rather than with emotion, and this
result in their criticisms. Observing the "anti-American
storm" among Koreans during the Olympics, a professor in Seoul
said that "it reveals that anti-American sentiment is not
restricted to intellectuals and students. Strictly speaking,
it does not mean that Koreans are against the United States,
but that they are beginning to understand the real facts about
America. Anti-Americanism, in short, is an inevitable
consequence of a gradual change in Koreans' perception of the
United States. An American living in Seoul, who witnessed
rising anti-American feelings during the Olympic period,
pointed out that "because Russians are coming to Korea for the
first time, they look exotic. We have ,however, been
overexposed to Koreans and therefore are at a
disadvantage.[Ref. 87: p.751]
The Seoul Olympics hurt the image of the U.S. in Korea in
large measure. From the start, the international sports event
was dotted with American misdeeds and Korean outcries against
them. Many were offended when American athletes, marching into
the stadium during the opening ceremonies, broke ranks and
held up signs for the television cameras. Koreans thought the
act hurt the dignity of an occasion for which many athletes
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had been preparing for years. They also felt insulted when the
runner Carl Lewis shoved Korean security guards on arrival at
Kimp'o airport and the swimmer Matt Biondi refused a glass of
tap water for fear of becoming ill. And they were horrified
when two American gold medalist swimmers were reported to have
stolen a statue from a Seoul hotel.
More serious than these incidents was the distorted NBC
coverage of the Olympics and Korea itself. First, NBC reports
on the opening ceremony showed nothing about the Han River
Festival, which won high praise, and the entrance of the host
country's team. Koreans criticized the network's coverage of
the unusual boxing brawl, claiming it devoted too much time to
the ringside violence instead of to the referee's "unfair" act
and the mistake of the world boxing officials. The news
organization also was criticized for not giving a full account
of the records set by Korea in the Games, even devoting more
time to the coverage of China. This was viewed as a
condemnation of Korea. Finally, nonsports coverage focused on
such topics as sweatshops, prostitution, and foreign adoption
of Korean children, which prompted a widespread outcry among
Koreans.
It is hard to believe that NBC's distorted reports
expressed only the news organization's view of Korea. Rather,
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it seems that the American people, American government, and
NBC all share the same view of the small country, and that
NBC coverage represents the voice of Americans and their
government.
C. KWANGJU DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT
Anti-American sentiment was rarely expressed until the
end of the 1970s. An overwhelming majority of the Korean
people were inclined to thank Americans for what they had done
for South Korea, but the general attitude changed drastically
after 1980 because U.S. realpolitik led the United States to
side with the authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan. The
United States has not been helping the cause of democracy in
South Korea, because Washington failed to prevent the coup of
December 12, 1979, that eventually paved the way for General
Chun's ascendancy to power in 1980; it failed to prevent the
use of South Korean troops under its command for the
suppression of the Kwangju uprising in May 1980, resulting in
the death of nearly 200 and numerous injuries and arrests in
Kwangju. Furthermore, they have criticized the U.S. not only
for supporting the Chun Government but for going out its way
to legitimize the government through summit meetings. They
tended to view the United States as propping the authoritarian
regime in South Korea, instead of supporting the cause of
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democracy.[Ref. 88:p.660]
Thus, many Korean intellectuals and students came to
believe that the United States stands in the way of
democratization of their country. In an interview with Korean
journalists, former U.S. Ambassador William Gleysteen analyzed
one of the primary causes of anti-Americanism as follows:
[Ref. 89: p.759]
The United States has been associated now with two
governments that have come to power by unorthodox means.
In 1961 and 1979-1980. Our relations with those
governments have been inescapable from a real point of
view. But, as a result, some Koreans hold the United
States responsible for the actions of those Korean
governments--first the Park government, and now the Chun
government. That is certainly one factor in anti-
Americanism.
Although it could have exercised considerable influence to
increase democracy because of long-standing South Korean
dependence, the U.S. endorsed Chun's dictatorship as necessary
for the stability and security of the Korean peninsula. An
American's view maintains that the U.S. does not want
friction with the Korean military and that an overt attempt by
the U.S. to prevent or roll back South Korean politico-
military action would constitute self-inflicted strategic
suicide, undercutting the ROK, the U.S.. interests in that
country and its role in Northeast Asian peace and stability.
Several momentous cases in the 1980s in which the U.S.
sided with the authoritarian regimes have drawan much
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criticism from the Korean people. After the collapse of Park
in October 1979, General Chun seized control of the armed
forces on December 12 in a nighttime coup. The moves toward
democratization in Korea were partially checked. While the
U.S. military publicly protested the coup and the Department
of State warned of further unrest if democracy was stalled,
the Carter administration did not make a decisive move against
Chun. Rather, as the political crisis in Korea intensified
over the next six months, the United States grew increasingly
to regard Chun and another period of military rule as the only
possible alternative for Korea.
On May 17, 1980, Chun's "new military" declared martial
law throughout Korea, bringing an abrupt end to the short-
lived movement for democracy. The following day students and
citizens in Kwangju protested martial law in street
demonstrations that escalated almost into an armed revolt. The
Kwangju uprising, later officially termed the Kwangju
Democratization Movement, ended in severe repression and the
death of many people.[ref.90: p.760]
In protest against the U.S., support of the Chun
Government, radical student activists bombed the U.S.
Information Services libraries in Pusan, Kwangju and Taegu in
the early 1980's. In May 1985, 73 students occupied the
American Culture Center library in Seoul, demanding among
other things, an apology for the alleged U.S. role in the 1980
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Kwangju incident. After three days of talks, they were
persuaded by U.S. Embassy official to leave the library. In
May 1986, radical students staged a violent anti-government
and anti-American rally in Inchon. Under the leadership of
radical students, it became increasingly fashionable for the
anti-government demonstrators to shout anti-American slogans
on and off the campuses.[Ref.91: p.660]
The Kwangju incidents inspired much of the anti-American
rhetoric echoing throughout demonstrations across South Korea.
Anti-government dissidents have charged the U.S. with
acquiescence and complicity in the slaughter, and many Koreans
have believed that the United States was at least indirectly
responsible for the tragedy by approving the commitment of
Korean troops under the authority of the CFC. To opponents of
military dictatorship, "Kwangju" became a symbol of U.S,
support for the authoritarian regime. From 1982 on, dissidents
began to criticize the United States more actively, and
finally, for the first time in nearly three decades, the cry,
"Yankee, go home," began to heard on South Korean campuses.
Militant students have not hesitated to attempt to seize the
American embassy, U.S. Information Service facilities, and
other American buildings. They have even launched firebomb and
stone assault on American military bases and premises used
primarily by military family members, and have burned the U.S.
flag. Many Koreans, initially shocked, are now little
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surprised at such news. This underscore an entirely new
dimension in South Korean attitudes.
The Kwangju tragedy remains a symbol of illegitimacy and
brutality. No dissidents accept the United States'
explanation that it had no authority to prohibit the
reassignment of the troops. The so-called "conscientized"
groups were persuaded of American complicity in that tragedy
and also in the coup led by General Chun. Moreover, the Reagan
administration's hasty move to give recognition and public
support to Chun by inviting him to be the first foreign head
of state to visit President Reagan at the White House made
this perception all the more credible.[Ref.92: p.11]
Taking the anti-American sentiment seriously, the U.S.
government recently took the unusual step of explaining the
American role in the 1980 Kwangju incident. In an official
statement issued in June 1989, the United States pointed out
that "one cause of increased anti-Americanism in Korea in the
1980s is the false impression held by many Koreans that the
U.S. was directly involved in, and significantly responsible
for the Kwangju tragedy--a misperception in part fostered by
the deception of the Korean authorities at the time, and in
part by the restriction on the dissemination of facts" about
the Kwangju incident during the Fifth Republic. It was
emphasized that the U.S. was never responsible for the
slaughter because "neither troops of the Korean Special
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Warfare Command(SWC) nor elements of the 20th Division,
employed by the Martial Law Command in Kwangju," were under
CFC operational command, and the U.S."had neither prior
knowledge of the deployment of SWC forces to Kwangju nor
responsibility for the actions there." But many Koreans--
especially students, intellectuals, and Kwangju citizens-- are
not willing to believe the explanations considering the
situation at the time.[Ref. 93: p.762]
D. TRADE FRICTION
1. General perception
Among the challenges and problems confronting U.S.-ROK
relations today are the growing pains as the relationship
rapidly shifts from one of patronage to partnership. For most
of its history, the ROK was burdened with annual trade
deficits. That changed in 1986 when Korea registered its first
significant current account surplus. In 1987, the surplus
swelled to about $10 billion. Similarly, the ROK has over the
last few years begun to run annual bilateral trade surpluses
with the U.S. Though the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea
is only five percent of its total trade deficit, it has become
highly and symbolic in the context of the much more
consequential U.S. trade dispute with Japan. However, in 1987,
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U.S.-ROK trade favored Korea by about $10 billion, as shown in
Table 1. [Ref. 94:p.40]
TABLE 1. U.S. Trade Deficit with Korea 1982-1987
($ billion)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
U.S. Exports 5.3 5.7 5.8 5.7 5.9 8.7
U.S. Imports 6.0 7.1 9. 4  10.0 12.7 18.3
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Data. Trade Net Data
Retrival System
The result is that Seoul has become a target for
American protectionist pressure. This situation is straining
bilateral relations. The United States has been pressing Korea
to open its market wider, while accusing Korea for its unfair
trade practices. Some critics charged that South Korea is a
"new Japan" that takes advantage of the open U.S., economy yet
restricts access to its own markets. In recent years, this has
prompted the U.S. to cut Korean textile imports and exclude
the ROK from the Generalized System of Preferences program,
which offers measured tariff reductions to developing nations.
Korea does not feel comfortable with suddenly rising U.S.
pressure. Korean college students expressed anti-U.S.
sentiments in their street demonstrations. Korean workers
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expressed their discontent with the U.S. protectionism. Korean
farmers staged demonstrations against the Korean government's
decision to import U.S. agricultural products.
Korea has yielded to the U.S. pressure, so has taken
several steps over the past several years in response to U.S.
concerns. But the United States wants more and faster open
from Korea. The ROK government has recently opened a number of
its markets to U.S. goods and services, most notably the
tobacco and insurance industries. Korea has also eased
restrictions on U.S. investment in Korea and expanded ROK
investment in the U.S. Seoul is particularly interested in
finding ways to adjust its trade with Japan. Despite its
growing surplus with the U.S., the ROK's trade with Japan in
1987 favored Tokyo to the tune of $5 billion. The South Korean
government is urging domestic companies to shift their
purchases of some items from Japanese to U.S. suppliers.
Still, Seoul currently is under strong pressure from
Washington to allow greater American access to a variety of
ROK markets. Korean citizens are increasingly critical of this
U.S. pressure and charge that Americans fail to take into
account the vulnerability of the ROK's export-driven and
heavily indebted economy. ROK public reaction to U.S. pressure
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for market access and cuts in certain Korean exports to the
U.S. has been highly emotional and nationalistic. Many Koreans
are particularly stung by charges that they represent a "new
Japan" and feel it unfair that their fledgling economic clout
is being compared to that of a superpower. They charge that
the ROK is becoming a scapegoat which Americans use to vent
their frustrations over U.S. trade friction with Japan. Many
Koreans also feel that the U.S., after generously supporting
the ROK through the hard times of the 1950s and 1960s, now
ironically is punishing Korea for its success.
Korean college students and workers have violently
expressed anti-U.S. feelings in street demonstrations. Their
sentiments are echoed in Korean society at large. Yet U.S.
pressure has persisted. This pressure upsets Koreans, because
they "remember Americans as the ones who saved them from the
North in the Korean War and helped us out of poverty."
(Ref. 95: p.325]
In an article about U.S. trade pressure published by
the Asian Wall Street Journal in 1989, one American
businessman stationed in Seoul put it this way: "Although
these efforts are designed to help American traders like me,
I have seen all too often how the best laid political plans
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can actually make it more difficult for us to maintain a
foothold in these countries...U.S. trade bullying fans the
flames of anti-Americanism here, and American business pays
for that. Even though Washington has some legitimate gripes
about closed Korean markets, Koreans feel that they are being
pushed around and that the U.S. does not recognize the great
strides they have made."[Ref.96: p.8]
On the other hand, democratization in Korea has
widened the scope of political participation and slowed the
pace of the government's decision-making process. Sweeping
economic reforms are no longer dictated by the Blue House.
Rather the National Assembly and a plethora of interests
groups now demand their say in the policy debate. And, as is
the case in the U.S., trade policy in Korea is highly
politicized and must be conducted with a maximum level of
consensus-building. Thus, Koreans hope that the U.S. attempt
to show appropriate sensitivity in its efforts to sustain
productive trade ties.
2. Koreans Attitude toward Trade Friction
Until the mid-1960s, trade between Korea and the
United States was very modest. Indeed, their trade
relationship was a poor cousin to the security alliance that
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dominated the Korea-U.S. partnership. Over the last twenty
years, however, this trade relationship has undergone dramatic
change. During the period of 1965 to 1985, two-way trade
between the two countries grew at the remarkable average
annual growth rate of 23%, fueled in large part by the
tremendous growth in the Korean economy. As a result, the
United States is today the biggest market for Korea's goods,
while Korea is soon to become America's sixth largest trading
partner.[Ref. 97: p.35]
In the course of this transformation, the Korea -U.S.
trade relationship has become an integral and vital element of
overall Korea-U.S. ties. Korea depends a great deal upon its
trade with the United States and access to its markets to
carry out its defense commitment and maintain peace in
Northeast Asia. Every year, Korea spends some 6% of its GNP
for defense. Without continued economic progress, Korea could
not afford these outlays and at the same time provide
progressively higher standards of living for all its citizens.
And, without further economic progress, it would become
considerably more difficult for the nation to carry out the
commitment to democracy that it shares so closely with the
United States.
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In recent years, however, Korea-U.S., trade
relationship have come under considerable strain. And then,
what are the major pending issues in trade? The U.S.
government has persistently demanded of South Korea the
following: (1) steady appreciation of the "Korean won" against
the dollar as a means of lessening the trade deficit; (2) more
import liberalization for American commodities such as grains,
beef and others; (3) recognition of American intellectual
properties; (4) allowing more market access for U.S. service
industries; (5) lowering the tariffs on such American products
as cigarettes; (6) allowing more market access for U.S.,
insurance, banking, and advertising firms; and (7) stopping
the dumping of Korean products in the American market. Because
of strenuous pressure from the United States, the South Korean
government has implemented some of these demands into its
economic policy. Many of the pending issues, however, have not
been resolved and continue being thorny issues for both
government.[Ref. 98: p.235]
To some degree, the trade frictions between the two
countries have been due to the very pace and extent of
transformation in their trade relationship. While both
countries have had to adjust to these changes, the adjustment
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process in the United States has been made particularly
difficult by its huge overall trade deficit, which has given
rise to unprecedently widespread demands for protection. In
response, U.S. policymakers have launched efforts to open up
markets overseas by combatting what they perceived to be
unfair trade practices on the part of U.S. trading partners.
Impatient with the pace of Korea's marketopening, United
States has actively sought to gain access to Korea's markets.
[Ref.99: p.36]
The strong reaction among Koreans reflected the deep
frustration they have felt over their trade relations with the
United States in recent years. For one thing, Koreans were
dismayed to find that in exerting pressure on Korea to open
its markets, the U.S. was mistaking Korea for Japan. Despite
a few superficial similarities, Korea is not a "second Japan."
Koreans' perception is that Korea is a fair trade partner
which plays by the rules and Korean firms no longer receive
significant government funding or financial support, and they
obey trade laws overseas.
A further source of frustration on the part of Koreans
is that the United States has tended to gloss over the
economic constraints that Korea has faced in liberalizing its
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markets. The United States seems to overlook the fact, for
example, that Korea is the fourth largest debtor nation in the
world with a foreign debt of over $47 billion and that most of
this amount is owed to U.S. financial institutions.
Furthermore, the United States does not appear to take into
account the tremendous defense burden which Korea shoulders,
which amount to some 6% of GNP per year.[Ref.100: p.37)
Koreans are a very nationalistic people who are highly
sensitive to foreign pressure. Such a pressure has fanned
anti-American sentiment among a small but nevertheless
increasingly vocal group in Korea society.
To know the nature of Koreans' understanding of the
cause of Korea-U.S. trade friction, a study was conducted by
using the editorials of Korean daily news papers as a
measurement of local understanding of the trade issues.
Specifically, Korean newspapers have traditionally enjoyed
guardianship of information, justice and public interests and
have been forming a role of public opinion. So, the editorials
listed in newspaper is well expressing the feelings of Koreans
on trade friction. In the newspapers, editorials dealing with
trade are grouped by issue as seen in Table 2 [Ref. 101 p.328]
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TABLE 2. Trade Issues (Chosun Ilbo)
Issues No. of Title of Editorial
Editorials
Korean Trade 9 Trade War





U.S. Pressure to 8 Don't Hurry in opening
open Korean Pressure and Opening

















Shock from the U.S.
Won-Dollar 5 Exchange Rate War
Exchange Rate Dollar Devaluation
Won, Yen, Dollar
Trade Talks 2 IMF
Korea-U.S. Aviation
Foreign Banks 1 Foreign Banks' Profit
Democratic 1 U.S. Democratic
Victory Victory in November
Election
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As seen in the Table, editorials dealing with U.S.
protectionism numbered 18, Korea trade policy 15, U.S.
pressure to open the Korean market 14, specific import matters
such as intellectual property right, cigarettes 11, Korea-U.S.
trade talks 10, won revaluation 9, U.S. discrimination against
Korea 5, etc. The newspaper editorials reflected Koreans'
emotional outburst. Also, they disclosed their cool reactions.
They suggested that the U.S. should restructure its industrial
sector using more research and development investments and
work to regain its competitive edge in the international
market. At the same time, they informed their readers as well
as the U.S. that Korea spends 25.3 percent of its budget on
defense as shown in Table 3 and still carries a $44.5 billion
foreign debt as shown in Table 4.[Ref. 102:p.330)
TABLE 3. Korean Budget and Defense Expenditures
(Unit: 10 billion Won)
1986 1987 Percentage of
Difference(%)
GNP 82,816 92,571 11.8
Budget 17,028 19,418 13.2
Defense 4,309 4,915 14.1
Expenditures
Defense in 25.3 25.3
Budget(%)
Source: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Report, Jan, 1987
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TABLE 4. Korea's Foreign Debt
(Unit: 10 billion Won)
Year 68 69 70 71 72 73
Foreign 12.0 18.0 22.5 29.2 35.9 42.6
Debt
Year 74 75 76 77 78 79
Foreign 59.4 84.6 105.3 126.5 148.7 205.0
Debt
Year 80 81 82 83 84 85
Foreign 273.7 324.9 373.0 400.9 430.5 468.0
Debt
Year 86 87 88 89 90 91





Korea has opened its market to 7000 items in the last
years from foreign countries. Korea is angry at the U.S.'s
continuous pressure to open the Korean market, and to gain
retroactive intellectual property rights. "Why only Korea?"
is the Korean complaint. The editorials claimed that no other
nations was forced to take such measures retroactively. The
Korean editorials wanted a gradual and slow institution of
129
intellectual property rights, and insurance, opening of the
financial, agricultural and advertisement markets. They
demonstrated their anger, criticizing the U.S.'s impatience
and its lack of appreciation of Korean efforts to open its
market. They used "the U.S. arrogance in trade negotiation."
"U. S., misunderstanding." "continuous U.S. pressure." American
style of negotiation was questioned. The aviation talks drew
most emotive editorials--KAL access to Chicago was denied, but
more U.S. airlines are now coming to Seoul. The Korean
newspapers contended that Japan, not the United States, is the
beneficiary from Korea's open-market policy, and the U.S.
trade bills functioned as a pressure to Korea. But they
changed their attitude from emotional response on the U.S's
pressure to more controlled cognitive defense. [Ref. 103:
p.514]
In the summer and fall of 1987, another questionnaire
survey was conducted in Korea to identify the level of
Korean's understanding of the cause of the Korea-U.S. trade
frictions. Table 5 shows four group's response to the
agreement on each issue.[Ref. 104: p.50]
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TABLE 5. CONTINGENCY TABLE
Issues by Agreement to the Statement
Group of Respondents(%)*
ISSUES College Business Bureau Assembly
The U.S.trade
deficit is the 80 90 93 85
cause of trade
friction
It is fair for











its market as 57 88 86 88






















ISSUES College Business Bureau Assembly
The U.S. is not
considering








pursue their own 45 26 9 23
domestic market
Koreans should

















eventually adopt 72 46 51 60
a protectionist
policy
* Figures represent row percentage of each group adding up
"strongly agree" and "agree" in contingency table.
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As shown in Table, students, businessmen, bureaucrats and
legislators agree to 11 statements out of 20. However,
students are different from three other groups. They are
young, idealistic, and nationalistic. The traits of elitism,
populism, resistance and negation of the establishment have
been found among Korean students. Business and government
managers show very similar attitude on the U.S.-Korea trade
frictions.
Korea's remarkable export growth has been possible by
exploring the relations between government and business.
Korea's efficient export directors and business executives
work in close cooperation for their export-oriented economy.
The government directors manipulated the public policy tools
which devised incentives that promote export. The national
Assembly men and women are very close to business and
government managers. Korea is homogeneous society, and that
Korean politics make businessmen, bureaucrats and legislators
interwoven.
Overall, understanding of Korean businessmen, bureaucrats
and politicians on the Korea-U.S. trade friction is relatively
sound. They do understand that the United States wants Korea
to open its market as much as the U.S. open its market to
Korea. Also, they forecast that free and fair trade will
eventually modernize the Korean economic system in the long
run. They are positive thinkers toward international trade.
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But they want gradual opening and adjustment to free and fair
international trade. Korea recently gained its trade surplus.
It still has formidable foreign debts. With limited natural
resources, the Korean government will continuously pursue
foreign market-oriented economy. Eventually, Korea will adopt
a free trade policy. Koreans hope that the U.S. government
consider the time of adjustment to free trade, Korean domestic




Throughout the mutual relationship between Korea and the
U.S., Korea perceived America as "liberator" who eliminated
the hated Japanese oppression lasted for 45 years(1910-1945),
or as "savior" when the U.S. helped fight in the Korean war,
or as "protector" who cared for Korean security.
The development of these relationship made the Korean
people to regard the America as a special state which has a
special concern and duty for Korea. This sort of perception
stems from the traditional Confucian order which dominated the
old Korean society.
Actually, in international relations, no other nations
have maintained such a long and friendly relationship of trust
and cooperation under the unilateral circumstances as that of
Korea and the United States. Therefore it is natural for
Korean to be oriented toward pro-American country in
international society. Occasionally, the relationship between
the U.S. and Korea has been recognized as "blood-hardened
relationship" since the Korean war and the Vietnam war. Before
the 1980s, Koreans perception of America was unilaterally
positive, and America was the symbol of greatness.
But in recent years, that kind of perception is changing
gradually. Of course most of the Korean people are still
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friendly to Americans but they do not hesitate to criticize
the United States. It is obvious that the pro-American
sentiment of the past has faded. This prompted one observer to
comment that the "special relationship" born in the foxholes
during the Korean war and Vietnam war had been turned into "a
marriage of inconvenience. Furthermore the inconvenience was
developed toward anti-sentiment in recent years.
What's the reason? Traditionally, the special
relationship formed throughout mutual relations made the
Korean people to rely on and expect from America what they
need. There are still some Koreans who believe and expect that
America should take a more active role in support of current
Koreans' desire. To the extent that America fails in meeting
their expectations, they are disappointed and disillusioned.
From the past, Korean's ardent desire was for Korea
reunification, sound democratization, and national
development. In the Koreans point of view, the U.S. is
associated with these matters at least indirectly. But still,
their ardent desire was not filled. Now, Koreans begin to
question the historical and fundamental causes of these
matters.
Koreans feel that the division of Korea is partly
responsible for America because it was originated from TT.S.
suggestion at the end of the World War II, even though it was
not the original intention of America. At this point, it is
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worth reminding the comment of Professor Robert T. Oliver. He
said that "The security of South Korea is a moral obligation
for the United States because it was our President Franklin D.
Roosevelt who, in early 1945, decided to invite Russia into
the Korean peninsula... Furthermore, it was upon Roosevelt's
insistence that the projected restoration of Korean
independence to follow Japan's defeat was postponed and
subjected to an awkward and unworkable plan to place Korea
under a four-power trusteeship... What eventuated was the 38th
parallel division of Korea, which led to the Korean war and
which poses continuing danger to the peace of the world.
[Ref. 105: p.22]
On the other hand, democratization in Korea is one of
their desires cherished from long times ago. The anti-
government movement in the 1980s has shifted its emphasis from
a struggle against dictatorship to a struggle against the
United States. The movement's leaders, in the course of
struggling for democracy, have grown to believe that the U.S.
has been the support behind the scenes for the military
dictatorship and that without removal of American influence in
Korea, democratization of South Korea is difficult. In the
anti-government demonstrations, students have always called
for the withdrawal of U.S. forces and American nuclear
weapons from South Korea, along with the overthrow of the
military dictatorship. The anti-American movement has moved
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side by side with the democratization struggle in the nation.
Furthermore, anti-Americanism grows worse and more
extensive since the recent trade pressure from America. Many
Koreans strongly protest their government's moves to end
protectionism and yield to American pressure. The people feel
that South Korea is trying to build up an economy that seems
to be very competitive in world markets, with its poor natural
resources and a heavy defense burden and trade deficit.
For the foreseeable future, there is bound to be friction
in the Korean-American relationship based on trade
competition, rising nationalism in South Korea, America's
relative loss of military and economic power and subsequent
weakening of its political influence, and Korean resentment
over past dependency. The rise of anti-Americanism is causing
Koreans to regard the United States as simply another foreign
nation, accordingly, to harbor no special expectations from it
and to feel no bitter disillusionment about it. Rational
criticism of the United States is not fundamentally harmful to
either country, but both need to review and readjust the
existing relationship. Perhaps the current anti-Americanism is
an expression of labor pains as an entirely new and more
mature relationship based on an equal partnership is built
between the South Korea and the United States.
What is perhaps wrong with the Korean attitude is that
Koreans often forget the fundamental truth that any
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individual, organization, or nation even such as America,
exists to help others as long as such help coincides with
self-interest. Because of this, Koreans often fall victim to
overblown expectations and painful disappointments especially
in the relations with United States.
To Korea, America is not just an ally but is recognized as
an essential ally. The reverse, however, is not always true in
international society. To America, Korea is merely one of
their friendly nations, strictly speaking. Accordingly,
Koreans tend to approach the matter of Korea as a bilateral
Korean-American issue, whereas Americans view the question
from the broader perspective of global strategy.
In conclusion, as for the improvement of the relationship
between the United States and South Korea, it is necessary for
the two countries to recognize that each have unique and
different historic experiences, diverse aspirations and
values, as well as current internal and external problems.
Each should have better knowledge and understanding of the
partner's mentality and way of life. One can not be too wrong
to say that both the Korea and the United States have
superficial knowledge of each other at best, and a minimum
amount of understanding of the partner. Both should make
efforts to minimize the differences of perception and
interests, and to understand the background of anti-feeling
while reducing misunderstanding of the partner's intentions
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through government endeavour and more civilian level contact.
Lastly, I can say that Korean's perception of America may
be one-sided or prejudiced. So, I think, it will be worth
researching for American student to talk American's
perception of Korea for balanced understanding.
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APPENDIX A
The full text of the Taft-Katsura Nemorandum
Count Katsura and Secretary Taft had a long and
confidential conversation on the morning of July 27th. Among
other topics of conversation, the following views were
exchanged regarding the question of the Philippine Islands, of
Corea, and of the maintenance of general peace in the East:
First, In speaking of some pro-Russians in America who
would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would
be a certain prelude to her aggression in the direction of the
Philippine Island, Secretary Taft observed that Japan's only
interests in the Philippine would be in his opinion to have
these Islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like
the United States, and not to have them placed either under
the misrule of the natives yet unfit for self government or in
the hands of some unfriendly European power. Count Katsura
confirmed in strongest terms the correctness of his views on
the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbour
any aggressive design whatever on the Philippines, adding that
all the insinuations of the "Yellow Peril" type are nothing
more or less than malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to
do mischief to Japan.
Second, Count Katsura observed that the maintenance of
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general peace in the extreme East forms the fundamental
principle of Japan's international policy. Such being the
case, he was very anxious to exchange views with Secretary
Taft as to the most effective means for insuring this
principle. In his opinion, the best and, in fact, the only
means for accomplishing the above objective would be to form
good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the
United States and Great Britain, which have common interest in
upholding the principle of "Open Door." The Count well
understands the traditional policy of the United States in
this respect and perceives fully the impossibility of their
entering into a formal alliance of such nature with any
foreign nation. But in view of our common interests, he cannot
see why some good understanding or an alliance, in practice,
if not in name, should not be made between those three nations
in so far as respects the affairs in the East. With such
understanding firmly formed, general peace in these regions
would be easily maintained to the great benefit of all powers
concerned.
Secretary Taft said that it was difficult, indeed
impossible, for the President of the United States to enter
even into any understanding amounting in effect to a
confidential informal agreement without the consent of the
Senate, but that he felt sure that without any agreement at
all the people of the United States were so fully in accord
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with a policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of
peace in the Far East that whatever occasion arose appropriate
action of the Government of the United States in conjunction
with Japan and The Great Britain for such a purpose could be
counted on by them quite as confidently as if the United
States were under treaty obligations to take it.
Third, In regard to the Corean question, Count Katsura
observed that Corea being the direct cause of our war with
Russia it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a
complete solution of the peninsula question should be made as
the logical consequence of the war. If left to herself after
the war, Corea will certainly drift back to her former habit
of improvidently entering into any agreements or treaties with
other powers, thus resuscitating the same international
complications as existed before the war. In view of the
foregoing circumstances, Japan feels absolutely constrained to
take some definite step with a view to precluding the
possibility of Corea falling back into her former condition
and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon
another foreign war.
Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the Count's
observations and remarked to the effect that in his personal
opinion the establishment of a suzerainty over Korea enter
into no foreign treaties without the consent of Japan was the
logical result of the present war and would directly
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contribute to permanent peace in the Far East. His
judgement was that President Roosevelt would concur in his
views in this regard, although he had no authority to give
assurance of this. Indeed Secretary Taft added that he felt
much delicacy in advancing the views he did, for he had no
mandate for the purpose from the President, and since he left
Washington Mr. Root had been appointed Secretary of State, and
he might seem thus to be trespassing on another's Department.
He could not, however, in view of Count Katsura's courteous
desire to discuss the questions, decline to express his
opinions which he had formed while he was temporarily
discharging the duties of Secretary of State under the
direction of the President; and he would forward to Mr. Root
and the President a memorandum of the conversation. Count
Katsura said that he would transmit the same confidentially to
Baron Komura.
End of quotation.
Prime Minister quite anxious for interview. If I have spoken
too freely or inaccurately or unwisely I know you can and will
correct it. Do not want to butt in but under circumstances
difficult to avoid statement and so told truth as I believe
it. Count Katsura especially requested that our conversation
be confined to you and the President so have not advised
Griscom. If necessary under your direction Foreign Office can
give him a copy.
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APPENDIX B
Cairo Agreement (U.S.A, U.K, CHINA) Dec 1, 1943
The several military missions have agreed upon future
military operations against Japan, The Three Great Allies
expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against
their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is
already rising.
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain
and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for
themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is
their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands
in the' Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the
beginning of the first World War in 1914 and that all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as
Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to
the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed,
The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement
of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course
Korea shall become free and independent.
With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony
with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will
continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations
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necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.
Signed: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Chiang
Kai-Shek
From : Dept. of State Bulletin. Vol. IX, p. 393
146
APPENDIX C
Extract From Moscow Agreement (U.S.A., U.K., U.S.S.R.)
December 27, 1945
1. With a view to the reestablishment of Korea as an
independent state, the creation of conditions for developing
the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible
liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted
Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a
provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all
the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and
agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean
peopled
2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean
government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of
the appropriate -asures, there shall be established a Joint
Commission consisting of representatives of the United States
Command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern
Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall
consult with the Korean democratic parties and social
organizations. The recommendations worked out by the
Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the
Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China
and the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final
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decision by the two Governments represented
on the Joint Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the
participation of the provisional Korean democratic government
and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out
measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the
political, economic and social progress of the Korean people,
the development of democratic self-government and the
establishment of the national independence of Korea.
The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted,
following consultation with the provisional Korean Government
for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United
States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom
and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a





From: Korea's Independence. Bulletin of the Department of State,




The gravity of the situation which confronts the world
today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the
Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of
this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to
present to you at this time for your consideration and
decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government
an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance.
Preliminary reports from the American Economic Mission now in
Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece
corroborate the statement of the Greek Government that
assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free
nation.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened
by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led
by Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number
of points, particularly along the northern boundaries,...
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the
situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped.
It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the
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authority of the Government throughout Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self
supporting and self respecting democracy. The United States
must supply that assistance. We have already extended to
Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are
inadequate. There is no other country to which democratic
Greece can turn. No other nation is willing and able to
provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek
Government.
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can
give no further financial or economic aid after March 31.
Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or
liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world,
including Greece.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the
United States is the creation of conditions in which we and
other nations will be able to work out a way of life ofree
from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with
Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which
sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other
nations.
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from
coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in
establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is
designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for
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all its members. We shall not realize our objectives,
however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain
their free institutions and their national integrity against
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them
totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank
recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples,
by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of
international peace and hence the security of the United
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have
recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against
their will. The Government of the United States has made
frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in
violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and
Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other
countries there have been similar developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The
choice is too often not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority,
and is distinguished by free institutions, representative
government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty,
freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political
oppression.
A second way of life is based upon the will of a minority
forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and
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oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and
the suppression of personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States
to support free peoples Mo are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressures.
I believe that we must assist free people to work out
their own destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily through
economic and financial aid which is essential to economic
stability and orderly political processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not
sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in
violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods
as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.
In helping free and independent nations to maintain their
freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that
the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave
importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall
under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its
neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion
and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle
East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent
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state would have a profound effect upon those countries in
Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties
to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they
repair the damages of war.
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries,
which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should
lose the victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse
of free institutions and loss of independence would be
disastrous not only for them but for the world Discouragement
and possible failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring
peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful
hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as
to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.
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APPENDIX E
Extract From Acheson's Speech
about Military Security in the Pacific
Now, let's in the light of that consider some of these
policies. First of all, let's deal with the question of
military security. I deal with it first because it is
important and because, having stated our policy in that
regard, we must clearly understand that the military menace is
not the most immediate.
What is the situation in regard to the military security
of the Pacific area, and what is our policy in regard to it?
In the first place, the defeat and the disarmament of Japan
has placed upon the United States the necessity of assuming
the military defense of Japan so long as that is required,
both in the interest of our security and in the interests of
the security of the entire Pacific area and, in all honor, in
the interest of Japanese security. We have American - and
there are Australian - troops in Japan. I am not in a position
to speak for the Australians, but I can assure you that there
is no intention of any sort of abandoning or weakening the
defenses of Japan and that what-ever arrangements are to be
made either through permanent settlement or otherwise, that
defense must and shall be maintained
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This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to
Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important
defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and thoze we will
continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the
Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to
hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations.
But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of
the Pacific, and they must and will be held.
The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the
Philippine Islands. Our relations, our defensive relations
with the Philippines are contained in agreements between us.
Those agreements are being loyally carried out and will be
loyally carried out. Both peoples have learned by bitter
experience the vital connections between our mutual defense
requirements. We are in no doubt about that, and it is
hardly necessary for me to say an attack on the Philippines
could not and would not be tolerated by the United States. But
I hasten to add that no one perceives the imminence of any
such attack.
So far as the military security of other areas in the
Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can
guarantee these' areas against military attack. But it must
also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or
necessary within the realm of practical relationship.
Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to say where such
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an armed attack could come from - the initial reliance must be
on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of
the United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to
lean on by any people who are determined to protect their
independence against outside aggression. But it is a mistake,
I think, in considering Pacific and Far Eastern problems to
become obsessed with military considerations. Important as
they are, there are other problems that press, and these other
problems are not capable of solution through military means.
These other problems arise out of the susceptibility of many
areas, and many countries in the Pacific area, to subversion
and penetration. That cannot be stopped by military means.
Secretary of State Acheson's Speech to the National Press Club
on January 12, 1950.
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